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For years, scholars have debated why parties choose to 
incorporate under Delaware law companies that operate businesses 
 
* Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of 
Law. I want to thank Thomas Main, Julie Davies, Anne Bloom, and Bert Kritzer for their 
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time to participate in my survey and to the various individuals who referred these attorneys 
to me. 
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in other states—since different answers to this question lead to 
different normative assessments of the practice. Traditionally, this 
debate focused on public corporations and ignored private firms and 
noncorporate forms of business. The exploding use of limited liability 
companies (LLCs) instead of corporations, and the formation of LLCs 
under Delaware law to operate businesses outside Delaware, call for 
expanding this discourse to ask “Why Delaware LLCs?” This Article 
adds to the recent literature seeking to answer this question 
empirically. It critiques recent studies that looked for statistically 
significant correlations between state of formation choices for LLCs 
and differences in state LLC statutes and legal infrastructure. Finding 
this methodology suffers from inherent limitations, this Article 
presents results from a different approach. I interviewed business 
attorneys whose clients have formed LLCs and asked them a battery 
of questions designed to ascertain why their clients formed LLCs in 
Delaware. The results of this survey provide important insights into 
the aspects of Delaware’s substantive LLC law and its legal 
infrastructure that motivate formation of Delaware LLCs, and thereby 
serve as an important complement to the existing statistical studies. 
INTRODUCTION 
 foundation of corporate law in the United States is the ability of 
parties organizing a corporation to choose the law governing 
relations among the investors (shareholders) in, and managers 
(directors and officers) of, the company by the simple act of where 
the organizers file a piece of paper and without regard to the state in 
which the company is actually headquartered or does business.1 This 
freedom to choose corporate law has been contentious for decades; 
some characterize it as the “genius of American corporate law,”2 
while others decry it as producing a “race to laxity.”3 
Traditionally, the debate over free choice of corporate law focused 
on public corporations, ignoring both nonpublic corporations and 
noncorporate forms of business.4 Recent scholarship, however, has 
moved beyond this confine and begun to examine state of formation 
 
1 E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.2.1 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
3 See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
4 E.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 698. 
A
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choices by those creating limited liability companies (LLCs). Studies 
have found that large LLCs, much like public corporations, often 
form under Delaware law, rather than the law of the state of the 
company’s principal place of business.5 The proliferation of Delaware 
LLCs established to operate businesses outside Delaware, in turn, 
raises questions that go to the core of the normative debate about free 
choice of law in the corporate—or now the broader business entity—
regime. Is Delaware attracting LLC formation by appealing to those 
expecting to be managers or majority owners of the entity and who 
prefer laws which are less protective of minority investors (thereby 
promoting a “race to the bottom”)? Does Delaware’s appeal instead 
lie in reaching a better balancing of interests for all parties (thereby 
facilitating a “race to the top”)? Does Delaware’s legal infrastructure, 
rather than its substantive rules, explain the decision to form LLCs 
under Delaware law (implicating neither race to the bottom nor race 
to the top concerns)? Or is something else going on? Examining these 
questions in the LLC context is important not only because of the 
exploding use of LLCs as the vehicle of choice for nonpublic 
businesses,6 but also because there is no a priori reason to assume the 
answers and what is at stake will be entirely the same with LLCs as 
they are for public corporations. 
So far, the primary effort to answer these questions empirically 
occurred in a pair of statistical studies7 that compared the extent to 
which parties form LLCs in jurisdictions other than their principal 
places of business against certain potentially explanatory variables 
representing differences among the states. Unfortunately, for reasons 
discussed later,8 inherent limitations in the methodology employed by 
these studies renders their results incomplete if not misleading. 
Accordingly, this Article presents the results of a study taking a 
different approach. I sought to gain insight into the motivations for 
forming LLCs under Delaware law by asking attorneys whose clients 
formed LLCs in states other than the LLCs’ principal places of 
business, particularly in Delaware, why their clients chose to form the 
 
5 See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
6 E.g., Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability 
While Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 132 (2008) (explaining that 
more businesses of all types are forming as LLCs than as other noncorporate entities and 
that LLCs were recently reported as accounting for more new business filings than 
corporations in twenty-nine states). 
7 See infra notes 62, 63 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra Part III.B. 
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LLCs where they did. This entailed either interviewing or obtaining 
written responses to a survey from over fifty business attorneys 
working at law firms of various sizes and in different parts of the 
country. The interview or written survey questions sought information 
on the reasons behind state of formation choices, including the impact 
of various statutory provisions, facts about the LLC, and the expected 
role of the client in the LLC. I further sought to gain information on 
the sources by which the Delaware judiciary might achieve a 
reputation relevant to choosing the state of formation for LLCs, and to 
explore, insofar as possible, the impact of the state of formation 
choice on the contents of LLC agreements. 
While this sort of survey has its own limitations and cannot pretend 
to offer the statistical significance of studies based upon a data set 
composed of thousands of LLCs, when combined with—or better yet 
used to guide—statistical studies, this sort of survey can provide 
much more robust insights than the statistical studies on their own. 
Specifically, the results of this survey support the tentative conclusion 
in one of the statistical studies and contradict the nil finding in the 
other statistical study as to the importance of the Delaware judiciary 
in the decision of many of those choosing to organize their LLCs 
under Delaware law, and also provide more detailed insights into this 
factor. More significantly, the results of this survey cast doubt on the 
conclusions of the statistical studies, which found that laws reducing 
the protections of minority investors had either an inverse or no 
statistically significant impact on the decision of where to form LLCs. 
By contrast, in this survey, the attractiveness of such laws commonly 
loomed large in the minds of attorneys whose clients chose to 
organize their LLCs under Delaware law. Finally, the survey suggests 
other factors not investigated in the statistical studies. For example, it 
points out the role that business attorneys’ common familiarity with 
Delaware’s, as well as their home states’, LLC law plays in selection 
of Delaware as a mutually acceptable choice of law for LLCs 
established by persons from different states. This different sort of 
legal infrastructure or network advantage possessed by Delaware 
shows both the utility of uniform business association acts in 
providing commonly known terms governing firms with owners from 
different states and also how a single state’s law can supply this utility 
without widespread adoption of a uniform act. 
The roadmap for this Article is the following: Part I of this Article 
situates noncorporate, nonpublic business entities such as LLCs in the 
debate over the impact of freedom to choose the law governing the 
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relationship between investors and managers. Part II will examine the 
existing statistical studies of LLC state of formation. It will explain 
the limitations of the correlation methods used in these studies. Part 
III of this Article will describe the methodology and the results of the 
survey I undertook. Finally, Part IV will outline the implications of 
the results of the survey and set out an agenda for further studies in 
this field. 
I 
LLCS AND THE DEBATE OVER CHOICE OF LAW THROUGH STATE OF 
FORMATION 
The ability of parties organizing a corporation to choose the law 
governing the relationship between investors (shareholders) and 
managers (directors and officers) rests on two doctrines: the 
incorporation doctrine, under which parties can organize a 
corporation under the law of any jurisdiction by filing with and 
paying a fee to the jurisdiction, when the only other contact of the 
company in the jurisdiction is a nominal office and agent for service 
of process,9 and the internal affairs rule, under which the law of the 
jurisdiction of incorporation governs the relations among investors 
and managers.10 
The debate about the normative impact of these doctrines stems 
from different assumptions about why persons choose to incorporate 
outside the state of a company’s principal place of business—which 
commonly means incorporating in Delaware. Those decrying freedom 
of choice operate on the assumption that persons choosing where to 
incorporate plan to be managers and often majority owners of the 
 
9 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 5.01(10) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 
101(a), 102(a)(2) (West 2012). By contrast, many continental European nations 
traditionally operated under the view that corporations must be formed in the nation in 
which the company had its headquarters—variously called the siege social, siege real, or 
seat theory. E.g., Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to Uberseering: Free Movement of 
Companies, Private International Law, and Company Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 177, 
180–85 (2003). Under this view, a nation would reject the effort to incorporate under its 
law if the corporate headquarters would be in another nation, and a nation in which a firm 
had its headquarters would refuse to recognize the firm as a corporation—meaning, for 
example, the firm would lack the capacity to sue in this nation’s courts and its owners 
might face personal liability—unless the firm incorporated under this nation’s, rather than 
another nation’s, laws. E.g., id. 
10 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971); MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.05 & cmt. (2008). But see CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2011) 
(commanding corporations having most of their shareholders, assets, and business in 
California to follow certain provisions of the California Corporation Code). 
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company, and that their goal is to find a jurisdiction whose law favors 
their interests by minimizing the protection of minority investors.11 
Competition among states to draw incorporations (with their fees) in 
the face of such motivation means adopting laws decreasing minority 
investor protection, thereby creating a “race for the bottom.”12 By 
contrast, those applauding freedom of choice argue that persons 
choosing the state of incorporation must consider the need to attract 
investors, and, hence, seek state laws which reflect an optimal balance 
between competing interests.13 Competition among states for 
incorporation under these circumstances produces a “race to the top” 
for the best corporate laws.14 Still others have asserted that the 
motivation for selecting a state of incorporation comes not from the 
specific content of substantive law, but rather from legal 
infrastructure—especially the depth of case law and judicial expertise 
which results from attracting numerous incorporations, and, with 
more corporations, the opportunity to resolve more corporate law 
litigation.15 Lawyers advising clients upon where to incorporate 
presumably prefer a jurisdiction in which there is more and clearer 
case law to provide guidance on issues of corporate law and a more 
sophisticated judiciary to resolve corporate law litigation should it 
arise.16 Selection based upon legal infrastructure decreases the 
pressure that states may have to reduce protection of minority 
interests in order to attract incorporation, but also may lead parties to 
incorporate in states with suboptimal statutory terms.17 
Traditionally, this debate focused on public corporations, as 
scholars assumed that nonpublic corporations incorporate under the 
 
11 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444–45 (1992). 
12 E.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974). 
13 E.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275 (1977). 
14 E.g., Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 
525, 526–27 (2001). 
15 E.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 842–47 (1995). 
16 But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory 
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 486–87 (1987) (suggesting that 
attorneys’ selfish financial interest could favor incorporation in a state with more 
ambiguous corporate law, which would require more billable hours to address). 
17 E.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 
99, 105 (2004). 
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law of the state in which they conduct business.18 A common 
conflation of nonpublic corporations with small businesses that 
operate on tight budgets in just one state underlies this assumption.19 
With such “mom and pop” businesses, the common advice is to 
incorporate in the state in which the company conducts its business—
thereby avoiding the added expense of paying fees both to the state of 
incorporation and to the state in which the company must qualify to 
do business, as well as avoiding the potential burden of being subject 
to suit in both the state of incorporation and the state where the 
company does business.20 By contrast, public corporations are 
typically large enough that state franchise fees become a trivial 
expense relative to the firm’s other expenses and resources.21 
Moreover, public companies commonly conduct business in multiple 
states—meaning they must pay fees to, and are subject to suit in, 
multiple states regardless of where the company chooses to 
incorporate.22 Also, the difficulties of collective action arguably make 
shareholders in a public corporation more dependent on state 
corporate law default rules than the few shareholders in the closely 
held company, who can meet and draft (and if necessary revise) a 
contract.23 Hence, those in charge of public companies, unlike the 
bulk of nonpublic companies, commonly find it worthwhile to choose 
their corporate law by incorporating outside the state of the 
company’s principal place of business—with those following this 
option predominately choosing Delaware.24 
The debate about free choice of corporate law has also traditionally 
ignored unincorporated business firms, such as partnerships and 
 
18 E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 n.24 (2002). 
19 See, e.g., Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of 
Privately Held Firms 4 (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research 
Paper No. 119, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1049581 (responding to the 
literature that assumes nonpublic corporations are small companies that normally 
incorporate in the state in which they operate by pointing out that nonpublic corporations 
come in all sizes). 
20 E.g., Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 365, 374–75 (1992). 
21 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 
46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 398 (2003). 
22 E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 374. 
23 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10 
(2006). 
24 Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate 
Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (showing that over half of all public 
companies incorporate in Delaware). 
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limited partnerships.25 This omission has its roots in partnership law. 
Unlike corporations, which come into existence by virtue of filing 
with the state26—thereby enabling the organizers to choose their 
governing law by virtue of choosing the state in which to file—
formation of partnerships requires no filing.27 Rather, a partnership 
automatically results when two or more persons carry on a business as 
co-owners without establishing any other business form28—even in 
cases in which the persons did not realize they had formed a 
partnership.29 This means that partners who wish to select a particular 
state’s partnership law to govern their relationship do so not by filing 
in a particular state, but by including a choice-of-law clause in their 
partnership agreement.30 Conflict of laws rules, however, do not 
allow the same free choice of partnership law through contractual 
choice-of-law provisions as established for corporations by the 
incorporation doctrine and the internal affairs rule.31 Further 
rendering the race to the bottom critique less applicable to 
partnerships, the lack of filing and corresponding fees presumably 
 
25 E.g., Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 4, at 698. 
26 E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.03 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (West 
2012). 
27 E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 113 (4th ed. 2008). 
28 E.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 2.02(a) (1997). 
29 See, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (1999); Minute Maid Corp. v. 
United Foods, Inc., 291 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1961). 
30 E.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choice-of-Law and the Unincorporated 
Entity, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 275–76 (1997). In the absence of a choice-
of-law term in the partnership agreement, the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
follows the approach applicable to contracts generally, under which the law of the state 
with the most contacts governs. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294 
(1971). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act simplifies this by calling for the law of the 
partnership’s chief executive office to govern. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 106 (1997). 
31 Under the Restatement approach, choice-of-law provisions govern terms subject to 
contract, unless doing so would violate a fundamental policy of the state whose law would 
otherwise apply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). The 
Restatement denies effect to choice-of-law provisions governing terms not subject to 
contract (such as mandatory fiduciary duties) if the contract chooses the law of a state with 
no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the choice. Id. §§ 187, 294. This would seem to put something of a crimp on 
using choice-of-law terms to avoid mandatory protections for minority partners by 
shopping the country for a state with lax laws—at least in situations in which the 
partnership does not have partners in all the states. But see ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY 
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.04 (Supp. 2002-2) (choice-
of-law clauses are now enforced so commonly in general partnerships that the result 
approximates the internal affairs rule). 
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reduces the incentives for states to create rules favorable to those 
deciding which state’s law should govern their partnership.32 
Formation by filing appears on the scene with limited 
partnerships33 and, as a result, parties organizing limited partnerships 
have the freedom to choose the law governing their relations simply 
by virtue of where they file.34 Many of the organizers of publicly held 
limited partnerships (so-called master limited partnerships) have 
taken advantage of this to organize their limited partnerships under 
Delaware law35—a phenomenon that a practitioner writing in the 
area
36
 seems to attribute to a provision in Delaware’s limited 
partnership act calling for maximum freedom of contract and 
allowing the limited partnership agreement to waive all fiduciary and 
other duties except that of good faith.37 Even so, scholars by and large 
have ignored the implications of free choice of limited partnership 
law—whether this produces a race to the bottom, optimum law, or 
selection based upon legal infrastructure. In part, this may reflect an 
assumption that the near-universal adoption by the states of a uniform 
law governing limited partnerships38—something which has been also 
true in the partnership context39—reduces the incentives for parties to 
consider choice of law by formation in a state other than that of the 
 
32 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 548–49 (1990) (stating that franchise fees motivated 
New Jersey and Delaware efforts to obtain corporate charters). 
33 E.g., UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201 (2001). 
34 Id. § 114 (providing that to form under a state’s law, a limited partnership need only 
have an office, which need not be its business office, in the state for service of process); id. 
§ 901 (codifying the internal affairs rule for limited partnerships). 
35 E.g., Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 4, at 705. 
36 John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471, 485–
86 (2005). 
37 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
1101 (West 2012). 
38 Every state other than Louisiana has enacted some form of the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act (ULPA). See The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, 
Legislative Fact Sheet – Limited Partnership Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Limited%20Partnership%20Act 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (listing eighteen states as having enacted the ULPA (2001)); 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976), 6B U.L.A. 1–2 (2008) (listing forty 
states as having enacted the RULPA (1976), only nine of which are among the eighteen 
states that subsequently enacted the ULPA (2001)). 
39 E.g., The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Acts: Partnership Act, 
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partnership%20 
Act (last visited July 4, 2012) (all states but Louisiana adopted the Uniform Partnership 
Act of 1914 and thirty-seven states subsequently adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act of 1997). 
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firm’s principal place of business.40 In part, it may reflect an 
assessment of the somewhat narrow and declining significance of 
limited partnerships as a form of business.41 
In the last couple of decades, another unincorporated business form 
has become ubiquitous in the United States. This is the limited 
liability company (LLC), which Germany invented in the late 
1800s,42 spread throughout Civil Law nations thereafter,43 and 
Wyoming imported into the United States in 1977.44 While the 
original purpose of the LLC outside the United States was to allow 
owners of non-publicly held businesses to obtain limited liability 
without meeting the strictures imposed for the protection of public 
investors on companies able to issue marketable stock,45 in the United 
States the objective is to have a form of business allowing limited 
liability for all owners (rather than just limited partners) that 
nevertheless qualifies for treatment as a partnership under federal 
income tax law.46 After a favorable ruling by the Internal Revenue 
Service in 1988 on the tax status of LLCs,47 LLC statutes quickly 
spread from state to state.48 The pace of the spread outstripped efforts 
to create a uniform act governing the new entity—and when the 
uniform act did appear, only a few states adopted it.49 As a result, 
 
40 E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 27, at 116. 
41 See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, SEC’Y OF STATE, DELAWARE DIVISION OF 
CORPORATIONS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://corp.delaware.gov 
/10CorpAR.pdf (showing that in Delaware from 2008 through 2010, 234,224 LLCs and 
82,637 corporations, but only 19,473 limited partnerships and LLPs combined, were 
formed). 
42 E.g., Marcus Lutter, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. 1, ch. 2, at ch. 2-6 (Alfred 
Conard & Detlev Vagts eds., 1998). 
43 Id. at ch. 2-11. 
44 E.g., Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 356–57 (2000) (citations 
omitted). 
45 E.g., Lutter, supra note 42, at ch. 2-6. 
46 E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate 
Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 434 (1995). 
47 Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
48 E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and 
Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 405–06 (1995). 
49 Only thirteen states have adopted either the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(ULLCA) or the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA). See The 
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Fact Sheet – Limited 
Liability Company (Revised), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org 
/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%20(Revised) (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2012) (listing five states, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming, 
which have adopted the RULLCA); Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act (1996), 6B U.L.A. 545 
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LLC acts have a degree of variation that might encourage parties to 
consider choice of law concerns when deciding in which state to file 
the papers required by the LLC statutes to organize the company.50 
Provisions in LLC statutes importing both the incorporation 
doctrine51 and the internal affairs rule52 facilitate this choice. 
In fact, a substantial number of LLCs have organized under 
Delaware law, despite having their principal places of business in 
other states. These are typically larger businesses53—showing the 
error in the assumption that nonpublic firms (which, for tax reasons, 
LLCs generally are54) operate only “mom and pop” businesses. Yet, 
one cannot assume that the reasons for this phenomenon and its 
normative implications are necessarily the same as is the case for 
public corporations. For example, it is not self-evident that the 
extensive case law and expert judiciary Delaware established through 
its history of litigation involving the internal affairs of public 
corporations automatically translates into a superior legal 
infrastructure to deal with the problems of nonpublic, noncorporate 
business entities that can tailor their governance rules by detailed 
contract.55 Moreover, the debate involving the race to the bottom 
 
(2008) (listing eight states, Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia, which have adopted the ULLCA). 
50 E.g., Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201 
(West 2012); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17050 (West 2011). 
51 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-104(a)(1) (requiring Delaware LLCs to have a 
registered office in Delaware, which may, but need not, be its place of business). 
52 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17450 (providing that the law of state of formation governs 
internal affairs of a foreign LLC); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-901 (same); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-Uniformity of Uniform Laws, 35 J. CORP. L. 327, 
331 (2009) (all states generally follow internal affairs rule for foreign LLCs). But see CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 17453 (granting members of a foreign LLC, who reside in California and 
who own at least twenty-five percent of the voting interest in the LLC, inspection rights 
under California LLC law). 
53 See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
54 Partnership-style tax treatment (the goal for using an LLC instead of a corporation) is 
not available for publicly traded firms except in certain industries. I.R.C. § 7704 (2009). 
55 Demonstrating what many might argue is a lack of sophistication in dealing with 
nonpublic companies, Delaware courts have been insensitive to the unique problems 
facing minority shareholders in closely held corporations. In Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 
1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993), the Delaware Supreme Court expressly rejected the pioneering 
Massachusetts’ approach that had recognized special fiduciary duties between 
shareholders in closely held corporations, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New 
England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (requiring majority shareholders in close 
corporations to give minority shareholders an equal opportunity to sell their stock back to 
the corporation when the corporation repurchases stock from the majority); see also Riblet 
Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996) (rejecting the approach in Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976), in which the Massachusetts 
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versus to the top with respect to the protection of minority investors 
may be different in the LLC context. For one thing, a lengthy contract 
commonly dictates owners’ rights in an LLC,56 which many might 
argue lessens the need for state law minority investor protections.57 
Cutting the other way, the argument made by some scholars—that the 
threat of increased federal intervention through securities law operates 
as a major constraint on how much Delaware is willing to favor 
manager or majority owner interests58—applies less with LLCs. This 
is because the interests in LLCs often may not constitute securities59 
and, in any event, LLCs rarely sell interests in the company in public 
offerings or list such interests for trading on a national securities 
exchange.60 Thus LLCs are rarely subject to most federal securities 
regulation.61 
 
Supreme Court required majority shareholders in close corporations to show a legitimate 
corporate purpose for actions which harm the minority. When coupled with the lack of any 
statutory remedy for oppression available to minority shareholders in Delaware, the result 
is to place minority shareholders in closely held Delaware corporations at the mercy of the 
majority in a manner long criticized by leading scholars concerned with closely held 
corporations. See, e.g., 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND 
THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 10:3 
(2012), available at Westlaw. Moreover, a well-developed body of court opinions and 
judicial expertise would seem to be of greatest utility when dealing with legal doctrines 
that are mandatory and imprecise, such as some fiduciary duties and various other rules in 
the corporate context. Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory 
of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 221–24 (2011). The 
ability of members in an LLC to tailor their relationship through a detailed contract, 
however, may allow participants in an LLC to supplant such doctrines with governing 
rules that require less judicial intervention. Id. at 225–27. The result may be to reduce the 
advantage Delaware obtains from its judicial expertise and experience in the public 
corporate context. Id. at 234–35. 
56 E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999); see 
GEVURTZ, supra note 27, at 118. 
57 E.g., R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 
2008 WL 3846318, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008), available at http://www.courts 
.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=110340; Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties 
Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 565, 585 (2007). 
58 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 616–17 
(2003). 
59 See, e.g., Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170, 174 (4th Cir. 2003). 
60 E.g., Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 465, 480 (2009). 
61 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012) (exempting 
sales which are not a public offering from the Act’s registration requirements); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12–14, 15 U.S.C. 78l, 78m, 78n (2012) (excluding companies 
which have neither securities listed for trading on a national exchange nor at least 500 
securities holders from registration requirements, most federal regulation regarding tender 
offers, and federal proxy rules). 
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Assessing the normative implications of allowing unfettered 
freedom to choose the governing LLC law requires asking why 
organizers form LLCs under Delaware law in order to operate 
businesses in other states. One can try to answer this question by 
poring through statistics on state of formation choices for LLCs 
looking for statistically significant correlations with differences in law 
and legal infrastructure between the states, or one can take the direct 
approach of asking those involved in such decisions. The two existing 
studies have taken the former approach, while I have taken the latter. 
Together, these two methodologies combine to create a more robust 
picture than possible by either methodology on its own. 
II 
THE EXISTING STUDIES 
A.  The Dammann & Schündeln and Kobayashi & Ribstein Studies 
Two sets of researchers, Jens Dammann and Matthias Schündeln,62 
and Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein,63 have attempted to 
ascertain the motivations for forming LLCs in states other than the 
states of the companies’ principal places of business. Following a 
methodology common to much empirical research, these studies 
investigated motivations by testing for statistically significant 
correlations between LLC state of formation data and potentially 
motivating differences among the states. 
It all begins with a data set. For these two studies, the primary data 
set comes from the Bureau van Dijk’s ICARUS database,64 which 
contains information on U.S. and Canadian companies of all sizes.65 
Critically, this database shows both the location of the companies’ 
principal places of business and the companies’ states of 
“incorporation” (or, more accurately in the context of noncorporate 
 
62 Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies 
Formed? An Empirical Analysis, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 126, University 
of Texas School of Law: 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (June 28, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633472. 
63 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional 
Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (2011). 
64 Id. at 113; Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 4. 
65 Icarus: Company Information and Business Intelligence for the U.S. and Canada, 
BUREAU VAN DIJK, http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/National 
/ICARUS.aspx (last visited July 15, 2012). 
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entities such as LLCs, the states of legal formation).66 This 
information allowed first Dammann and Schündeln (D&S), and 
subsequently Kobayashi and Ribstein (K&R), to determine the 
proportion of LLCs with a principal place of business in each state 
that formed under the law of another state (outbound migration).67 It 
also allowed the two teams to determine the proportion of LLCs with 
a principal place of business in other states that formed under the law 
of each state (inbound migration).68 
D&S initially used this data to confirm a couple of propositions 
that they and others probably already suspected—if for no other 
reason than because of reported court opinions involving Delaware 
LLCs operating businesses outside of Delaware.69 The ICARUS 
database contained information on the number of employees working 
for each company, which D&S could use as a measure for the size of 
the business operated by the LLC.70 Comparing size (measured by 
number of employees) versus state of formation, D&S established 
that, while smaller LLCs normally followed the conventional advice 
for small business and formed under the law of the state in which they 
had their principal place of business, larger LLCs often departed from 
this practice and organized under the law of a state different than their 
principal place of business.71 D&S also found that Delaware was the 
biggest winner when larger LLCs chose to form in a state other than 
that of the LLC’s principal place of business.72 
 
66 While the database does not directly report the form of business used by companies, 
the researchers could separate out the LLCs by the commonly required suffix “LLC” or 
“Limited Liability Company,” see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-102(1) (West 2012), 
found in the names of the LLCs. Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 4–5; 
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 113. 
67 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 6; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 
113–17. 
68 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 6; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 
113–17. 
69 See, e.g., Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007) (discussing a 
Delaware LLC that was conducting business in New York); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. 
Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999) (discussing a Delaware LLC formed by a California and 
New York corporation); Zrii, LLC v. Wellness Acquisition Grp., Inc., No. 4374-VCP, 
2009 WL 2998169 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2009) (discussing a Delaware LLC that had its 
principle place of business in Utah); Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced 
Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing a Delaware LLC that 
was conducting business in Latin and South America).  
70 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 6. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. Kobayashi and Ribstein confirmed this result but also found some inbound 
migration to Florida and Nevada. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 116. 
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The more difficult question is why larger LLCs form in states, 
especially Delaware, other than the state of their principal place of 
business. To answer this question, both the D&S research team and 
the K&R research team compared various differences among the 
states against the degree to which LLCs with a principal place of 
business in each state would organize under the laws of another 
state.73 Of course, it is impractical to compare LLC state of formation 
statistics against every other conceivable difference between the states 
to see if there is a statistically significant correlation. Hence, the 
researchers sought differences that would allow them to test various 
hypotheses derived from academic legal literature and the 
researchers’ analysis as to why persons organizing LLCs might 
choose formation under the law of a different state than the state of 
the LLC’s principal place of business.74 
D&S looked for potentially explanatory variables in substantive 
law and in legal infrastructure.75 In the area of substantive law, D&S 
wanted to test the hypotheses that those controlling the decision of 
where to form LLCs would, because they expect to be owners, favor 
the interests of owners over creditors of the company, and would, 
because they expect to be managers or majority owners, favor 
managers and majority owners over minority investors in the 
company—in other words, the propositions at the heart of the race to 
the bottom debate.76 Hence, D&S tested, as potentially explanatory 
variables, provisions in LLC statutes that D&S believed either 
protected owners from creditors or decreased the protection of 
minority investors from actions by managers and majority owners. In 
terms of legal infrastructure, D&S worked from the hypotheses that 
the quality of the state’s judiciary, as well as network effects from 
commonly adopted or long-existing LLC laws (meaning, for example, 
more judicial interpretation of statutory language), could motivate 
selection of a state as the state of LLC formation.77 Hence, D&S 
tested as potentially explanatory variables a ranking they believed 
measured judicial quality, as well as whether the state adopted the 
 
73 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 6–7; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 
63, at 112, 129–36. 
74 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 6–7; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 
63, at 112, 129–36. 
75 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 6–15. 
76 Id. at 6–7. 
77 Id. at 13–15. 
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Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and when the state first 
enacted an LLC law.78 
In the first iteration of their study released in 2008,79 D&S grabbed 
attention by claiming a statistically significant inverse relationship 
between less minority investor protection, as well as less prospect of 
managerial liability, and state of formation choices for LLCs80—in 
other words, parties choosing where to form LLCs seemed to prefer 
laws protecting minority investors and increasing the likelihood of 
liability of managers. As the authors characterized it, there was a 
“flight from laxity,” rather than a race to the bottom.81 In a 2010 
revision of their paper, D&S largely continue to stand by this result, 
but changed, without explanation, a number of their other results in 
areas such as creditor protection and legal infrastructure.82 Neither 
iteration of the study found—contrary to expectations from the legal 
literature—a statistically significant correlation between judicial 
quality and state of formation choices.83 
Disagreeing with most of the variables D&S chose to test, K&R 
came up with a new list. Like D&S, K&R assumed that judicial 
quality, as well as network effects from having an LLC statute with 
provisions common among states, may motivate choice of state of 
formation by those organizing LLCs.84 However, K&R came up with 
different variables to measure judicial quality and such statutory 
network effects than the variables used by D&S.85 With respect to 
provisions of substantive law decreasing protection of creditors and 
minority investors (the race to the bottom thesis), K&R came up with 
 
78 Id. at 6–14. 
79 Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies 
Formed? An Empirical Analysis, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 126, University 
of Texas School of Law: 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Apr. 28, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126257. 
80 Id. at 27–28. 
81 Id. at 19. 
82 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 15–19. The 2010 paper claims a 
statistically significant correlation between state of formation choices and decreased 
likelihood of liability to creditors and a statistically significant inverse correlation between 
selection of a state in which to form LLCs and adoption of the Uniform LLC Act, id., 
whereas, in both cases, the 2008 paper reported no statistically significant correlations, 
Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 79, at 21–22. The 2010 paper introduces a variable 
looking at freedom of contract, Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 14, but does not 
discuss results for this variable. 
83 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 19; Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 
79, at 21–22. 
84 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 103–09. 
85 Id. 
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another set of variables different than those used by D&S. In the case 
of minority investor protection and managerial liability, K&R also 
shifted focus and terminology, testing the hypothesis that organizers 
look for laws allowing themselves “flexibility,” which, among other 
things, can entail contracting out of minority investor protections.86 
Finally, K&R added a variable they believed measured innovation as 
an additional substantive law factor not tested by D&S.87 
K&R failed to produce any attention-grabbing result; indeed, they 
asserted that their results undercut D&S’s surprising race from laxity 
conclusion.88 This was not because K&R found a race toward laxity. 
Rather, they found no statistically significant correlation between 
LLC state of formation choices and statutory provisions either dealing 
with creditor rights or allowing flexibility.89 As a matter of fact, 
K&R, for the most part, found no statistically significant correlation 
between LLC state of formation choices and the substantive terms of 
LLC statutes.90 Indeed, almost the only significant correlation to any 
motivational factor found by K&R was—contradicting D&S—
judicial quality.91 From these results, K&R drew the conclusion that 
efforts expended by state legislatures to draft and change their LLC 
statutes were not worthwhile, at least if the goal is attracting the 
formation of LLCs to the state.92 
B. Limitations of the Correlation Methodology 
As interesting and potentially useful as the results of the D&S and 
K&R studies are, the stories they tell about the motivations for 
forming LLCs under Delaware law, or under the law of other states 
beyond the LLCs’ principal places of business, are incomplete and 
potentially misleading. This is because of two problems inherent in 
the correlation methodology. 
The first problem—commonly known if often ignored—lies in the 
old saw that “correlation does not prove causation.” The legal 
infrastructure or judicial quality hypothesis provides a simple 
illustration in its original corporate context. This hypothesis posits 
that an extensive body of case law and an experienced judiciary 
 
86 Id. at 104–05. 
87 Id. at 105–06. 
88 Id. at 109–12, 133–34. 
89 Id. at 132, 135. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 136. 
92 Id. at 128–32, 136. 
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dealing with corporate law issues will attract incorporation in the 
state.93 The manner in which the state obtains such an extensive body 
of case law and experienced judiciary, however, is to have already 
attracted a large number of corporations to form in the state.94 This 
means that a correlation study will show a statistically significant 
correlation between a state having the desirable judicial infrastructure 
and the extent of incorporation in the state, but this will not prove that 
the desirable judicial infrastructure caused, as opposed to simply 
resulted from, the large number of companies incorporating in the 
state.95 
The other problem with the correlation studies involves choosing 
the explanatory variables to compare with the LLC state of formation 
statistics. D&S and K&R had to determine the hypotheses regarding 
the motives for LLC state of formation choices that they would test 
and the specific factual variables they would use to test each 
hypothesis. K&R’s criticisms of D&S illustrate that both of these 
determinations stem from judgments upon which researchers can 
easily disagree. All the statistical wizardry in the world cannot create 
more complete and useful results than are possible given the 
particular selection of comparisons for testing. 
Consider first the hypotheses tested in the two studies. The 
hypotheses tested by D&S, as well as by K&R, largely involved the 
state’s judiciary and the LLC statute. This means the studies will miss 
the relevant motive for LLCs in which the choice to organize under 
the law of a state other than the LLC’s principal place of business 
stems from reasons different than the state’s judiciary or LLC statute. 
To illustrate this point, suppose that organizers of a substantial 
number of LLCs form under Delaware law because the organizers’ 
attorneys know Delaware law. Alternately, suppose that organizers of 
a substantial number of LLCs choose to form under Delaware law 
because they desire the perceived prestige or “brand” value associated 
with being a Delaware business entity—perhaps because large public 
 
93 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
94 Id. 
95 One might argue that the correlation of LLC state of formation statistics with judicial 
infrastructure more likely suggests causation because the legal infrastructure resulted from 
corporations rather than LLCs. Yet, this begs the question of why a judicial infrastructure 
equipped for public corporations would necessarily be attractive to those forming LLCs, 
thereby raising the question of whether the correlation results from some other factor. 
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corporations often incorporate in Delaware.96 Since correlation 
studies cannot tell us anything about hypotheses they do not test, and 
since the D&S and K&R studies did not test these hypotheses, they 
will miss why these LLCs formed under Delaware law. The moral is 
that correlation studies like those undertaken by D&S and K&R stand 
a good chance of missing potentially important motivational factors 
unless the researchers have some method for assuring that the 
hypotheses they test have covered every realistic possibility. 
The dispute between D&S and K&R was, for the most part, not 
about the hypotheses to test; rather, it was about what specific factual 
variables the study should use to test each hypothesis.97 This dispute 
arises because there are no simple factual metrics labeled “judicial 
quality relevant to LLCs” or “laxity in protecting creditors or minority 
investors in the context of LLCs.” Instead, D&S and K&R had to 
come up with specific factual variables that would serve as proxies 
for the broader motivational factor under each hypothesis.98 To the 
extent these proxies do not truly reflect the underlying hypothesis, the 
correlation, or lack thereof, tells us very little. 
For their measure of judicial quality, D&S used a ranking of state 
courts prepared by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.99 As K&R point 
out, however, critics have asserted that the Chamber of Commerce 
ranking stems largely from the proclivity of courts in the state to 
award punitive damages.100 Unless punitive damage awards are an 
important feature of litigation involving the internal affairs of LLCs—
as opposed to certain personal injury or consumer protection 
litigation—this criteria is fairly irrelevant to those aspects of judicial 
 
96 In fact, as discussed below, these motivations did turn up in a fair number of 
responses to the survey I conducted. See infra text between notes 237 and 238, and 240 
and 241. 
97 Kobayashi and Ribstein also criticized the statistical methodology used by Dammann 
and Schündeln, especially Dammann and Schündeln’s failure to compare inbound and 
outbound migration for individual LLCs by each variable in order to see whether the LLCs 
were moving to states that actually differed on the particular variable. Kobayashi & 
Ribstein, supra note 63, at 133–35. 
98 Id. at 104; Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 5. 
99 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 5 (relying on U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, 2007 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS 
RANKING STUDY (2007), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites 
/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/research/2007liability_system_ranking_study
.pdf). 
100 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 129 (citing, as an example, Theodore 
Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for 
Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 978–87 (2009)). 
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quality potentially important in selecting the state of formation for 
LLCs.101 To deal with the questionable relevance of the Chamber of 
Commerce ranking, K&R also tested rankings based upon how often 
state courts had their opinions cited and how many opinions each 
judge wrote,102 as well as the number of opinions of each state’s 
courts that dealt with LLC issues.103 Recognizing, however, that the 
citation and productivity rankings were not limited to LLC cases, and 
that the quantity of opinions about LLCs may say nothing about the 
quality of the opinions, K&R were understandably tentative in the 
conclusions they drew from the correlations their study found 
regarding judicial quality.104 
Another aspect of infrastructure tested by both teams involved the 
typicality of the state’s LLC statute—the hypothesis being that a 
statute which is more typical among states may have more 
interpretative opinions, or may otherwise establish a greater comfort 
level for attorneys recommending in which state their clients should 
form LLCs.105 As a variable to measure this hypothesis, D&S used 
adoption by the state of the Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act.106 Treating adoption of a uniform act as the proxy for having a 
typical statute could make sense (even if it would only give results for 
a few outlier states) if, as historically been the case with the Uniform 
 
101 While formation of an LLC under the law of a state opens the LLC to suit in that 
state, this does not mean the LLC cannot be sued in another state in which a dispute arose, 
it entered a contract, or an accident occurred. See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 634–36 (3d ed. 2008). If such other 
state has a greater proclivity to award punitive damages, one can expect third party 
plaintiffs to choose this option over bringing the suit in the state of formation. Also, of 
course, the issue of whether to award punitive damages in a suit by a third party against an 
LLC does not fall within the internal affairs rule. See, e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 
A.2d 206, 214–15 (Del. 1987) (explaining the scope of the internal affairs rule). Actually, 
one suspects that the Chamber of Commerce may have viewed a reduced proclivity to 
award punitive damages (typically against businesses) as not only important on its own, 
but also as reflective of a broader “pro-business” (or really pro-defendant) attitude in the 
state’s judicial system. If so, then use of this variable may be testing less the legal 
infrastructure hypothesis than it is the reduced minority investor protection hypothesis. See 
Cary, supra note 12, at 669–72 (pointing to pro-defendant attitude of Delaware courts in 
corporate law cases as part of the way in which Delaware seeks to appeal to those planning 
to be directors or majority shareholders). 
102 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 129 (including as a proxy, Stephen J. Choi 
et al., Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts? (Chi. John M. Olin Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 405, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130358). 
103 Id. at 129–30. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 107–08; Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 13–14. 
106 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 13–14. 
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Partnership and Uniform Limited Partnership Acts,107 almost every 
state adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. Here, 
however, not only have relatively few states adopted the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act,108 but many provisions in the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act are quite different from the 
LLC statutes in most states.109 Hence, K&R created a variable based 
upon the degree to which the state’s LLC act contained provisions 
common to other states’ LLC acts.110 Yet, such a variable may say 
little without some qualitative assessment as to the significance of the 
provisions that are, and are not, common.111 Finally, since a similar 
effect of more case law and greater familiarity can also arise from the 
statute’s longevity, both K&R and D&S used the vintage of the states’ 
LLC laws as another variable.112 Given the speed with which LLC 
statutes spread from state to state in the early 1990s,113 and passage of 
time since then, it is difficult to see how much significance this is 
likely to have. 
In their effort to measure each state’s protection of LLC creditors, 
D&S decided to focus on how the states apply the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil to LLCs.114 This frequently litigated doctrine115 
allows a court, in the case of certain inequitable conduct, to take away 
the limited liability normally enjoyed by the controlling owner of a 
corporation116 or LLC,117 and so would seem a potentially important 
 
107 See supra notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra note 49 and accompany text. 
109 E.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-Uniformity of Uniform 
Laws, 35 J. CORP. L. 327, 342, 350 (2009). 
110 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 107. 
111 Kobayashi and Ribstein recognize this point when they attempt to separately 
analyze provisions dealing with tax and third-party rights, where they view uniformity as 
important, and rights between the members, where they argue that uniformity is less 
important. Id. Still, not every provision involving rights between the members of an LLC 
is of the same salience; a provision allowing waiver of all duties between members would 
presumably be more important than a provision specifying default rules for meetings 
between members. 
112 Id. at 132; Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 14–15. 
113 See supra note 48. 
114 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 7–8. 
115 E.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 & n.1 (1991) (stating that piercing constitutes the most 
frequently litigated corporate law topic (if one treats various fiduciary duty claims as 
separate topics)). 
116 E.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993); Kinney 
Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray 
Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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metric of a state’s protection of creditors. Yet D&S used a 
questionable variable to measure a state’s proclivity toward piercing 
an LLC. Specifically, as their measure of differences between states 
in the area of piercing, D&S used the presence or absence of a 
provision in the state’s LLC statute that bars piercing LLCs based 
upon the owners’ failure to follow formalities regarding meetings.118 
D&S operated on the assumption that such a provision decreases the 
danger that courts will pierce an LLC. This, however, gives such 
statutory provisions far more credit than they deserve. To begin, since 
LLC statutes do not call for the observance of so-called corporate 
formalities involving meetings—such as mandatory annual 
shareholder meetings to elect directors119—courts can figure out that 
the failure to observe such meeting formalities should not be a factor 
leading to piercing LLCs even without the LLC statute pointing out 
the obvious.120 Besides, despite their common mention in corporate 
piercing cases121 and in literature dealing with the doctrine,122 the 
failure to follow such corporate formalities does not really lead to 
piercing the veil even in the corporate context.123 Making D&S’s use 
of this variable even more questionable, the drafters of these 
 
117 E.g., In re Suhadolnik, No. 08-71951, 2009 WL 2591338 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 
2009); Ledy v. Wilson, 831 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); McCarthy v. Wani 
Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App. 2007). 
118 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 8. 
119 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.01(a) (2008). 
120 E.g., NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 178 (2d Cir. 
2008); D.R. Horton Inc.-New Jersey v. Dynastar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 
WL 1939778, at *31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 10, 2005); Kaycee Land & Livestock 
v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002); 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 
RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 12:3 (2012), available at 
Westlaw. 
121 See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 687. 
122 See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 989–90 
(1971). 
123 Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion 
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 866–67 
(1997) (explaining that courts invoke the defendant’s failure to observe corporate meeting 
formalities as a make-weight in order to support a decision to pierce justified by other 
facts). Admittedly, even if the significance of so-called corporate formalities in piercing 
cases is the equivalent of “an old wives’ tale,” its frequent mention might lead to the 
perception of its significance among attorneys and parties choosing in which state to form 
an LLC, and so a statutory provision stating that failure to observe meeting formalities in 
an LLC will not be grounds for piercing could figure into decisions in which state to form 
LLCs despite the lack of necessity for the provision. Id. at 867. In this instance, however, 
the difference between states would be a matter of legal infrastructure (clarity of law) as 
opposed to substantive protection of creditors (implicating race to the bottom concerns). 
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supposedly helpful provisions in some states, such as California,124 
did such a poor job that the provisions actually create an argument 
that the failure to follow meeting formalities might, under some 
circumstances, become grounds to pierce.125 
In any event, it turns out that piercing may simply provide an 
inappropriate metric for testing the impact of creditor protection on 
choice of state of formation for LLCs. Because piercing is a common 
law doctrine applied by courts in a highly fact-specific and opaque 
manner,
126
 it may be difficult to document state-by-state differences, 
even if they exist. While some scholars have compared the percentage 
of decisions in each jurisdiction in which the plaintiff succeeds rather 
than fails to pierce the corporate veil,127 it is uncertain whether this 
reflects different proclivities toward piercing or whether it simply 
reflects factual variations in often small samples of decided cases. 
Besides, it is not clear that piercing the veil of limited liability comes 
within the internal affairs rule or, instead, whether the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the debt occurred governs this question.128 The 
latter approach would, of course, render piercing irrelevant to the 
choice of state of formation. 
Given such difficulties with using piercing as a variable, K&R 
focused on provisions in LLC statutes that impacted the rights, not of 
the LLC’s creditors, but of creditors of the LLC’s owners.129 
Specifically, they looked at provisions which prevented such creditors 
from reaching the assets of the LLC or obtaining the decisional rights 
regarding firm management or dissolution that the debtor-owner had 
possessed in the firm.130 Still, while the law governing the rights of 
the members’ creditors may not be as amorphous as the doctrine of 
 
124 CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2011). 
125 The California statute states that the failure to observe meeting formalities will not 
be grounds for piercing unless the LLC agreement calls for meetings, thereby creating a 
negative pregnant that the failure to hold meetings called for in an LLC agreement can be 
grounds to pierce. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, California’s New Limited Liability Company 
Act: A Look at the Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous, 27 PAC. L.J. 261, 299–301 (1996). 
126 E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 506–13 
(2001). 
127 E.g., Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 114–23 (2010). 
128 Compare Realmark Inv. Co. v. American Fin. Corp., 171 B.R. 692, 695 (N.D. Ga. 
1994) (applying law of state of incorporation), with Abu-Nassar v. Elders Futures Inc., No. 
88 Civ. 7906 (PKL), 1991 WL 45062, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991) (finding it unclear if 
law of state of incorporation applies to piercing claim). 
129 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 106–07. 
130 Id. For an example of such a provision, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 18-703 (West 
2012). 
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piercing, subtle variations in statutory language131 and context-driven 
judicial decisions132 seemingly leave the scope of these rights 
unsuited to the simple divisions and grouping necessary for a 
statistical correlation study. 
The variables in the D&S study involving minority investor 
protection and managerial liability, because of their attention-
grabbing result, call for the most attention. D&S reduce the highly 
complex subjects of minority investor protection and managerial 
liability in LLCs to five criteria, which they then apply on a simple 
binominal scale.133 The criteria are the rights of the owners to cash 
out either under the default rule or through a statutory oppression 
remedy, the ability of the majority to force out the minority by 
dissolving the LLC, the standard of culpability for LLC managers 
under the duty of care, and the ability to waive liability of LLC 
managers for breaching their duty of care.134 
Long experience with closely held corporations suggests that D&S 
were on the right track in considering that the ability of minority 
owners to cash out the minority’s investment is a highly important 
protection of the minority in a non-publicly held business. Minority 
owners of a nonpublic company lack the ability of dissatisfied 
minority shareholders in a public corporation to liquidate their 
investment at any time by selling in an established market. At the 
same time, the history of closely held corporations is a tale of 
majority shareholders frequently exploiting the majority’s power by 
curbing the dividends, or any other money, received by minority 
shareholders from the corporation; all the while, the majority 
shareholders continue to enjoy income from the corporation in the 
form of salaries and perquisites.135 The ability of the minority to force 
redemption by the company at fair value is a potentially important 
guarantee against such an effort to squeeze the minority out from 
enjoying any benefit from the minority’s ownership in the company 
 
131 E.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 7:8, app. at 7-9. 
132 E.g., In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 541–42 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (holding that 
bankruptcy trustee of sole member of LLC obtained management rights in LLC despite 
charging order as exclusive remedy provision); Olmstead v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 44 So. 
3d 76, 83 (Fla. 2010) (holding that a charging order is not an exclusive remedy); Delta 
Dev. & Inv. Co. v. Hsiyuan, No. 47192-9-I, 2002 WL 31748937, at *16 (Wash. App. Dec. 
9, 2002) (concluding that a constructive trust is not subject to limitations imposed on 
charging orders). 
133 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 8–13. 
134 Id. 
135 E.g., 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 55, §§ 2:01–2:20 
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either through distributions or the ability to sell in an established 
market.136 
A problem, however, arises when we look at the specific variables 
D&S use to address the minority’s ability to force a cash-out. First, 
they look to whether the LLC statute contains a provision allowing, as 
a default rule, withdrawal by LLC members (owners) and receipt of 
the fair value of the members’ interest.137 Such a default rule can be 
very useful for unsophisticated owners of an LLC, who are unlikely to 
anticipate the danger of a squeeze-out until it happens and leaves 
them with an illiquid investment and no distributions.138 On the other 
hand, owners who do not anticipate the danger of an illiquid 
investment obviously will not choose a state in which to form their 
LLC based on a default rule that protects them from a hazard they fail 
to recognize. At the same time, owners who do want the right to cash 
out at fair market value can put this right in the LLC agreement139 
rather than find a state of formation with this as the default rule. 
Conversely, parties who anticipate being majority owners and want to 
avoid granting withdrawal rights to the minority can accomplish their 
goal by placing in the LLC agreement a provision denying the right of 
withdrawal, even if they formed the LLC in a state with withdrawal 
rights as the default rule.140 In other words, anyone who is concerned 
enough about the issue to make this grounds for choosing the state of 
formation for the LLC really does not need to worry about the default 
rule because they can include desired terms in the LLC agreement.141 
 
136 E.g., J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A 
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (1977). 
137 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 9–10. 
138 See, e.g., Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama 
Limited Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909, 931 
(1998). 
139 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-603, -604 (West 2012) (right to resign and 
obtain fair value for member’s interest only exists if LLC agreement so provides); CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 17252(a) (West 2011) (unless the articles of organization or written 
operating agreement provide otherwise, a member withdrawing from an LLC is not 
entitled to payment for the member’s interest in the limited liability company). 
140 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, §§ 32, 36 (LexisNexis 2005) (while the LLC 
agreement cannot eliminate a member’s right to resign, the LLC agreement sets what the 
resigning member is entitled to receive from the company); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
347.103(2), .121(1) (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-37(A), (C) (West 2011) 
(unless LLC otherwise provides, a member has the right to withdraw and receive fair 
market value). 
141 It is also worth noting that withdrawal rights are not the only way to protect 
minority owners from being squeezed out of any economic benefit of ownership. 
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In the 2010 iteration of their study, D&S added a variable based 
upon whether the state’s LLC act enables the minority to seek 
dissolution based upon oppression.142 Since the minority’s ability to 
force dissolution or a buyout under such provisions depends upon 
convincing the court that the majority has engaged in oppression or 
the like,143 the protection provided by such provisions is less 
automatic than a no-fault ability to withdraw and receive fair value 
under an LLC agreement or a statutory default rule. Still, the 
oppression term may have more impact on choice of state of 
formation than the default rule regarding withdrawal—at least for 
organizers seeking to avoid having their LLC subject to the 
oppression remedy—because it is uncertain whether an LLC 
agreement can waive the oppression remedy in states where it exists 
by statute.144 A problem, however, is that D&S’s effort to reduce the 
oppression remedy to a simple binominal variable suitable for 
correlation testing significantly oversimplifies the law in this area. 
Not only do the statutes grouped together by D&S differ in potentially 
significant language,145 but judicial decisions applying these statutes 
 
Provisions either in an LLC agreement or in statutory default rules that prevent majority 
owners or managers from obtaining money from the company (such as through salaries) 
not shared proportionately with, or approved by, the minority also deter the majority from 
cutting distributions shared by all owners. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-
outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 505–06, 510–11 (1995). 
Hence, a state with a default rule preventing the majority from setting its own salary, e.g., 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17004(b) (West 2011), may provide roughly the same degree of 
minority investor protection as a state with a default rule giving the minority withdrawal 
rights. 
142 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 8–9. 
143 E.g., S-S, LLC v. Merten Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, No. 292943, 2010 WL 4679524, at *6 
(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents 
/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20101118_C292943_32_292943.OPN.PDF (finding that the 
plaintiffs failed to prove oppressive conduct). 
144 Compare Sivsa Entm’t v. World Int’l Network, No. B164377, 2004 WL 1895080, at 
*7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2004) (in an opinion that is not published and therefore not 
citable under California rules, the court held the statutory dissolution provision is not 
subject to waiver), with R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 
3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=110340 (enforcing waiver). By 
contrast, organizers who wish to provide the oppression remedy presumably can create the 
equivalent in the LLC agreement, even if they form their LLC under the law of a state 
whose LLC statute does not contain such a provision. 
145 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 8–9. Kent Tillman, LLC v. Tillman 
Constr. Co., No. 263232, 2006 WL 143289 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006), available at 
http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20060119_C263232_44_26
3232.OPN.PDF, illustrates the importance of statutory differences. There, the court 
affirmed dismissal of a claim brought under a provision in Michigan’s LLC statute that 
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complicate the situation further.146 Moreover, provisions in LLC 
statutes allowing judicially ordered dissolution on grounds borrowed 
from partnership law147 occasionally might pick up some cases of 
oppressive conduct148—thereby further muddying the significance of 
the distinctions which D&S seek to draw between jurisdictions whose 
LLC statute does and does not contain an explicit provision allowing 
dissolution for oppression. 
The flip problem from the majority owner trapping the minority in 
an illiquid investment not producing any distributions (the “squeeze-
out”) is the majority forcing the minority to sell out (the “freeze-
out”).149 It is therefore not surprising that D&S consider LLC laws 
impacting the prospect for a freeze-out in their variables concerning 
minority investor protection. What is curious, however, is the specific 
law they chose as the sole measure of this prospect. D&S chose to 
focus on the presence or absence of a default rule in the LLC statute 
allowing dissolution of the LLC by majority vote.150 It is true, as I 
stated in an article D&S cited in support of this variable,151 that a 
majority owner could exercise a power to dissolve the LLC with the 
plan of capturing the business in the ensuing liquidation of the 
company—thereby freezing out the minority.152 Yet, some LLC 
statutes (notably including Delaware’s) provide easier avenues, which 
D&S ignore, for freezing out minority owners. The freeze-out through 
 
provided relief in cases of “oppressive conduct.” Id. at *4. The statute stated, however, that 
acts consistent with the operating agreement were not oppressive, and the complaining 
member’s expert conceded that the challenged acts, while unfair, were consistent with the 
agreement. Id. Since squeeze-outs by the majority presumably would commonly consist of 
taking advantage of powers the majority enjoys under the agreement (such as setting 
distributions) in ways the minority did not anticipate, this language radically reduces the 
scope of the oppression remedy. 
146 For a discussion of the cases, see 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 11:5 
n.25. 
147 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (West 2012); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 
702 (McKinney 2007). 
148 Compare Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825, 831 (S.D. 2008) (ordering 
dissolution of an LLC pursuant to a statutory provision allowing dissolution in situations 
in which it is not reasonably practical to carry on in conformity with the agreement, when 
two of the four members exercised all the power in the LLC and ran the LLC for their own 
benefit), with Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill. 1960) 
(ordering dissolution of a corporation for oppression when fifty percent faction ran the 
corporation without regard for the other fifty percent owners). 
149 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 141, at 498 (defining squeeze-out and freeze-out). 
150 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 10–11. 
151 Id. at 11; Gevurtz, supra note 141, at 525–28. 
152 Gevurtz, supra note 141, at 525–28. 
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dissolution requires the majority to outbid the minority for the 
company’s assets in the ensuing liquidation—perhaps because the 
majority has a financing advantage or because the majority 
appropriates some value attached to the business (such as goodwill or 
customers) without paying for it153—otherwise, the majority could 
find itself frozen out. Even if the majority acquires the business, there 
are potentially undesirable side effects associated with dissolution as 
a means of affecting a freeze-out, as the majority will need to 
refinance the debts of the LLC154 and might lose the value of any 
contracts that terminate upon the LLC’s dissolution.155 A slicker 
approach to freezing out the minority, available under some LLC 
statutes including Delaware’s,156 is a freeze-out merger with a shell 
company (such as another LLC set up solely for this purpose).157 This 
avoids the prospect that the majority might not end up with the 
business in the liquidation sale, as well as the burdens of refinancing 
debts and potentially losing contracts entailed by undertaking a 
dissolution and liquidation.158 
In any event, these are default rules that parties can contract 
around.159 Hence, their main hazard is to unsophisticated parties who 
do not recognize the impact until the majority exploits a power, which 
the majority may not have even realized it possessed at formation, to 
kick out the minority. Such parties, however, will not choose a state 
of formation based upon a default rule, the impact of which they do 
not appreciate. By contrast, a minority investor who wants to avoid 
the danger of a freeze-out can contract to limit the ability of the 
majority to dissolve at will or merge the LLC just as easily as 
insisting on forming the LLC in a state whose default rules do not 
allow these actions by majority vote. A majority owner who wants the 
freeze-out option could ask for provisions in the LLC agreement 
 
153 E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing Partnership Freeze-Outs, 40 MERCER L. REV. 
535, 541–42 (1989). 
154 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804(a)–(b) (West 2012) (requiring payment 
of firm debts on dissolution); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17353(a) (West 2011) (same). 
155 See, e.g., Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Ohio 
1985) (contract terminated on dissolution of partnership). 
156 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209. 
157 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 141, at 530–32. 
158 E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 27, at 349. 
159 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(b) (West 2012) (stating that, unless otherwise 
provided in the LLC agreement, a majority vote is sufficient to approve an LLC merger); 
id. § 18-801(a)(3) (stating that, unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, a two-
thirds vote can dissolve the LLC). 
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allowing dissolution or merger by majority vote—or, even more 
directly, a provision that gives the LLC the right to redeem minority 
interests at the majority’s option—even if the parties form the LLC in 
a state having contrary default rules.160 It is possible that majority 
owners might prefer that the freeze-out potential remain in default 
rules rather than in contract terms so as to attract less attention from 
potential minority investors. This assumes that merger or dissolution 
terms buried in a contract are more likely to alert the minority to the 
freeze-out danger than would such provisions found in state law 
default rules. In any event, the attempt to slip things past the minority 
through selecting default rules rather than contract terms would entail 
a very subtle calculation, and so perhaps is not common enough to be 
statistically significant in a correlation study of thousands of LLCs—
even though it would be significant to the minority in those cases in 
which such shenanigans occur. 
Turning to fiduciary duties and managerial liability, D&S focus on 
the duty of care.161 This seems odd insofar as the duty of care, in 
contrast to the duty of loyalty, appears not to be that frequently 
litigated,162 or likely to produce liability,163 in nonpublic, 
noncorporate businesses. Hence, provisions in LLC acts allowing 
LLC agreements to modify liability for breaching the duty of care—
which D&S use as one of their testing variables164—would seem less 
important than provisions in LLC acts, like Section 18-1101 of 
Delaware’s law, that allow much broader waivers of fiduciary duties, 
including the duty of loyalty.165 The other variable regarding the duty 
of care used by D&S is whether or not the state’s LLC statute 
 
160 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-752(B) (2011) (unanimous vote for mergers 
subject to contrary LLC agreement); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4702 (West 2012) 
(mergers on unanimous vote or vote called for in LLC agreement); id. § 450.4801 
(dissolve on unanimous vote or the vote called for by LLC agreement); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-25-108 (2012) (unanimous vote for dissolution unless otherwise provided); id. § 17-
25-111 (same for mergers). 
161 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 12. 
162 E.g., Miller, supra note 57, at 574–75 (stating that fiduciary duty litigation in LLCs 
overwhelmingly involves the duty of loyalty rather than care); Elizabeth S. Miller & 
Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: The Business 
Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 370 
(2005) (discussing the lack of authority on partners’ duty of care, rather than loyalty, prior 
to the RUPA, and the lack of duty of care cases under either the RUPA or the limited 
liability company statutes). 
163 Miller & Rutledge, supra note 162, at 373–79 (discussing the deferential standards 
generally applied by courts in dealing with the duty of care in the noncorporate context). 
164 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 12–13. 
165 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West 2012). 
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contains a specific provision defining breach of the duty of care to 
equal gross negligence or some other heightened requirement.166 
Such provisions, however, may do little more than codify the 
otherwise existing judicial understanding of the duty of care in the 
business-management context.167 Moreover, even if such provisions 
do more than codify the existing case law, it is unclear whether they, 
in fact, increase or decrease the often uncertain standard for 
culpability in the absence of a statutory definition.168 Hence, it is 
difficult to interpret what any correlation regarding this variable is 
saying. 
Rather than limiting their testing to provisions allowing waiver of 
the duty of care, K&R use statutes allowing complete waiver of 
fiduciary duties as their variable for provisions that protect managers 
from liability (but which K&R prefer to view as one measure of 
flexibility available under the statute).169 One issue here, however, is 
whether this variable groups together provisions whose impact on 
choice of state of formation is different, or separates provisions whose 
impact on choosing the state of formation is the same. For example, 
suppose those choosing where to form LLCs do not draw the same 
line as K&R in deciding what provisions allow or do not allow 
complete waivers. Moreover, suppose in the minds of those deciding 
in which state to form LLCs, one state’s (Delaware’s) provision 
allowing complete waivers enjoys an advantage over other states with 
the same statutory language because of more favorable judicial 
interpretations.170 In any of these events, K&R’s testing will 
understate the statistical significance of the impact of provisions 
allowing waivers. 
As two other measures of “flexibility,” K&R use the availability of 
inter-business-form (“inter-species”) mergers under provisions that 
allow mergers of LLCs with corporations and the like, and the ability 
 
166 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 62, at 12. 
167 E.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 9:2; Miller & Rutledge, supra note 
162, at 369. 
168 E.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 9:2; Miller & Rutledge, supra note 
162, at 369. 
169 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 104–05. 
170 E.g., H. JUSTIN PACE, CONTRACTING OUT OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN LLCS: 
DELAWARE WILL LEAD, BUT WILL ANYONE FOLLOW? 7 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786876 (“[T]he enforceability of waivers of fiduciary duties by 
LLC members remains very much in question in most of th[e] states [categorized by the 
Ribstein & Keatinge treatise on LLCs as having provisions equivalent to Delaware’s act] 
due to negative LLC case law, variations in the statutory text of individual states, and 
negative limited partnership . . . law.”). 
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to admit members (owners) into the LLC, despite those members 
having made no contributions to, and having no economic interest in, 
the company.171 The inter-species merger is a potentially handy 
device that allows, with somewhat greater convenience, changes of 
business form and business combinations that otherwise can occur 
through a sale of assets or an acquisition of interests followed by 
dissolution.172 Bringing in members who make no contribution and 
lack any economic interest can be a technique for preventing 
dissolution of LLCs at the behest of creditors who have seized all the 
interests of members having economic interests.173 Hence, this 
variable may go to the creditor protection hypothesis. 
K&R add one additional hypothesis for what motivates an LLC’s 
state of formation choice; whether the state engages in innovation in 
its law.174 The problem here is to decide what to measure as 
“innovation.” After all, a new and unique provision in a state’s LLC 
law might be a brilliant innovation or a poorly conceived 
idiosyncratic notion, or both, depending upon who one is asking. 
K&R use adoption of the “series LLC” as their measure of 
innovation.175 In a series LLC, the LLC agreement can divide the 
firm into compartments, each with its own members, managers and 
interests, and each of which can create separate rights and duties with 
regard to specific property and liabilities.176 While the series LLC is 
perhaps innovative, a positive correlation between LLC state of 
formation statistics and states allowing series LLCs may not show any 
advantage for innovation per se, as opposed to the particular 
desirability of series LLCs. 
This, in turn, raises the question of why series LLCs may be 
desirable. In fact, even without such statutory provisions, LLC 
agreements could have created such a compartmentalized 
management structure and division of interests, which would govern 
the rights and obligations of the LLC’s members vis-à-vis each 
 
171 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 105. 
172 E.g., PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 1201 cmt. (1992). 
173 See, e.g., In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (in deciding that the 
trustee administering the bankruptcy estate of the sole member of an LLC could obtain 
management rights and dissolve the LLC, the court emphasized that the result would be 
different if there were other members in the LLC). 
174 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 105–06. 
175 Id. 
176 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (West 2012). 
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other.177 The trick is to bind third party creditors of the LLC to an 
arrangement limiting what assets of the firm they can reach. In the 
absence of series LLCs, this would have entailed the formation of a 
multitude of separate LLCs—something persons operating LLCs 
commonly do.178 The concern, however, is that courts might pierce 
the veil of limited liability between closely related LLCs, and, 
accordingly, the goal of series LLCs is to reduce this possibility.179 
Hence, a positive correlation involving series LLCs and state of 
formation choices may show more about creditor protection as a 
selection factor than it does about innovation per se as a selection 
factor. Moreover, this advantage of series LLCs may be more 
apparent than real. Not only do the statutory provisions authorizing 
series LLCs require actions180 seemingly designed to prevent the sort 
of mingling of assets that often provides the ground to pierce the veil 
between commonly owned companies,181 but one suspects that a 
court would still pierce the veil in the event of fraud or the like.182 
Hence, it is not clear how much broader significance one can draw 
from any lack of correlation between series LLCs and state of 
formation statistics. 
Beyond these specifics, the K&R study raises one overarching 
question: the study found virtually no statistically significant 
correlation to any tested factor other than its measures of judicial 
quality.183 However, we know that many larger LLCs choose to form 
under Delaware law even though their principal places of business are 
in other states. Something must motivate this. Are we to conclude that 
the only significant motivation is judicial quality? Before accepting 
such a result, one should ask whether there are other possible 
motivating factors not tested by K&R, or whether the correlation 
 
177 E.g., id. §§ 18-302, -404, -503, -504 (allowing for classes of members and managers 
and allocation of financial rights among members however the LLC agreement provides); 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17005 (West 2011) (LLC operating agreement governs rights of 
members with limited exceptions). 
178 See, e.g., REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT prefatory note 
(2006) (“Given the availability of well-established alternate structures (e.g., multiple 
single member LLCs, an LLC ‘holding company’ with LLC subsidiaries), it made no 
sense for the Act to endorse the complexities and risks of a series approach.”). 
179 E.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 4:17. 
180 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b) (West 2012) (requiring each series in a 
series LLC to keep separate records and to hold separately its assets). 
181 See, e.g., Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.1993). 
182 See, e.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 4:17 (courts should retain the 
power to police fraud despite series LLC). 
183 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 63, at 136. 
GEVURTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  12:57 PM 
2012] Why Delaware LLCs? 89 
methodology employed by K&R was insufficiently sensitive to detect 
the impact of the possible motivating factors they did test. In other 
words, the very narrowness of the bottom-line result reached by K&R 
cries out for a comparison with a study using a different methodology. 
III 
THE BUSINESS ATTORNEY SURVEY 
A.  Methodology 
Given the correlation studies’ limitations, what would be useful is 
an additional study under a methodology that can accomplish several 
things. It should provide grounds, beyond simply a theoretical 
hypothesis, for determining whether a correlation does in fact stem 
from causation, or, alternately, whether a lack of correlation 
supporting a hypothesis might stem simply from limitations in the 
correlation study. It should provide a comprehensive set of 
hypotheses to ensure correlation testing for any reasonably possible 
motivational factor. It also should provide insights to help ensure that 
the specific factual variables tested by the correlation study in fact 
measure the motivational factors of each hypothesis. 
Surveying actual decision makers in the field is a methodology to 
accomplish all of these objectives.184 If real decision makers in the 
field report reasons for their actions which match a hypothesis tested 
by a correlation study, then there is a much stronger basis to conclude 
that a statistically significant correlation between the tested 
hypothesis and state of formation statistics reflects causation. 
Meanwhile, a contrary result in the survey should serve as a caution 
before reaching such a conclusion. Moreover, if the survey finds real 
decision makers report acting for reasons that do not generate a 
statistically significant correlation, then the lack of correlation might 
reflect limitations in the correlation study that, in turn, call for 
refining the correlation test. Beyond this, open ended questions to real 
decision makers in the field can produce a more comprehensive list of 
hypotheses regarding the motivating factors than relying just on the 
theoretical literature and the analysis of academics. Along similar 
lines, the answers of real decision makers in the field can check either 
 
184 See, e.g., EARL BABBIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 272–73 (2nd ed. 2002) 
(stating that survey research is probably the best method available for collecting original 
data used to describe a large population; once a survey is completed, secondary analysis 
can be conducted, using the data to answer questions that the original researcher did not 
focus on). 
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attributing undue significance to, or missing the significance of, 
specific factual variables as measures of the motivational hypotheses 
which otherwise may result from exclusive reliance on academic 
analysis. By broadening the range of hypotheses and refining the 
variables used to test the hypotheses, a survey of decision makers can 
allow those conducting statistical studies to improve their results. The 
statistical studies then can either confirm or raise questions as to 
whether the survey results were typical or idiosyncratic. In this 
manner, the different methodologies complement each other. 
1.  The Sample 
The sample for this survey consists of business attorneys whose 
clients had formed LLCs. While such attorneys may not technically 
decide where to form the LLC, their advice to the client who makes 
the decision presumably will be highly influential if not decisive.185 
Even where the attorney’s advice does not drive the decision, they 
presumably are in a position to hear the reasons for the client’s state 
of formation choice.186 
I found attorneys who were willing to participate in the survey 
through a number of different avenues. A variety of sources referred 
 
185 See., e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 273 (1985). 
186 This obviously leaves out LLCs formed without the assistance of attorneys. While 
one normally assumes that such LLCs generally are smaller enterprises and tend to form 
under the law of the state of their principal place of business, it is possible that some might 
form under Delaware law. Several websites maintained by firms in the business of aiding 
the do-it-yourself crowd to form corporations or LLCs discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of formation under Delaware law. E.g., How to Select a State for 
Incorporation, BIZFILINGS, http://www.bizfilings.com/learn/which-state-incorporation 
.aspx (last visited July 10, 2010); Where to Form an LLC, MYNEWCOMPANY.COM, 
http://www.mynewcompany.com/whichstate.htm (last visited July 10, 2010). Proving the 
adage that you get what you pay for, the free advice on these websites on the reasons to 
form one’s business under Delaware law is muddled and often based upon erroneous 
understanding of the law. See id. These sites place considerable emphasis on the relative 
fees and taxes imposed by states on firms forming under the state’s law, but then 
acknowledge the prospect that the state of the company’s actual place of business may 
impose fees and taxes which offset the savings of forming in a low-fee or low-tax state. Id. 
So in the end, the whole discussion is just confusing. The sites tout the advantages of 
Delaware’s Chancery Court, but then misconstrue the impact by suggesting the 
applicability of this advantage to claims brought against the company by outsiders such as 
consumers. Id. All of this suggests that seeking to divine the reasons for unrepresented 
parties choosing to form LLCs under Delaware law may turn into a study of mythology, 
rather than responses to actual differences. 
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many of these attorneys to me.187 The largest group, however, 
consisted of attorneys who volunteered for the survey in response to a 
posting on a Listserv maintained by the Committee on LLCs, 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities of the Business Law Section 
of the American Bar Association.188 
This sort of “convenience sampling” admittedly introduces the 
potential for selection bias relative to a survey based upon a 
completely random sample. This is especially the case in the group of 
attorneys who volunteered in response to the Listserv posting.189 Not 
only might the nature of attorneys who volunteer, versus those who 
did not volunteer, introduce some selection bias, but the fact that 
these attorneys subscribe to a Listserv on LLCs and other 
unincorporated businesses might distinguish them from business 
attorneys who are less interested in LLCs and yet might aid clients in 
forming such entities. Indeed, during the course of the survey, a 
number of these attorneys told me of their leadership positions in their 
firm or in their state bar with respect to issues dealing with LLCs. On 
the other hand, this selection bias may create a sample more likely to 
correspond to the sort of attorneys whose clients form LLCs in 
Delaware, and, hence, are in a better position to give the reasons for 
that decision. 
In any event, the surveyed attorneys represent a cross section both 
in terms of geography and in terms of the size of their law firms. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution among the states of the attorneys 
responding to the survey.190 The sample includes attorneys practicing 
in twenty-three states. These states are in all regions of the country. 
  
 
187 These sources included attorneys I knew, contacts through other law professors both 
at my school and others, working through my school’s career development office, contacts 
made through my school’s Board of International Advisors, and contacts through the 
California Bar Association’s Committee on Partnerships, LLCs and Unincorporated 
Entities. 
188 I am indebted to James Wheaton, Chair at the time of the Committee on LLCs, 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities of the Business Law Section of the American 
Bar Association, for this posting. 
189 Indeed, the referral sources were sufficiently eclectic to introduce a fair amount of 
random chance into the set of attorneys I found from referrals. 
190 The number appearing in each state on the map is the number of surveyed attorneys 
in each state; the darker the shading, the more surveyed attorneys were in the state. 
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FIGURE 1. Dispersion of surveyed attorneys by state 
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Figure 2 presents the distribution of the attorneys responding to the 
survey in terms of firm size. The firms ranged from sole practitioners 
to “American Lawyer top 100” law firms. 
FIGURE 2. 
 
 
A total of fifty-three attorneys responded to this survey.191 This 
consisted of thirty-six interviews over the telephone or in person, and 
seventeen attorneys who responded to the survey in writing.192 This 
 
191 As explained below, the final segment of the survey asked each attorney whether he 
or she had discussed state of formation choice for LLCs with other attorneys at his or her 
law firm or more generally. If so, the survey then asked each attorney whether he or she 
expected I would receive similar answers as given by the surveyed attorney in response to 
the survey if I talked with the other attorneys with whom the surveyed attorney had 
discussed this topic. Most of the surveyed attorneys reported that they had discussed the 
topic of LLC state of formation with other attorneys and that I would receive similar 
answers if I interviewed the other attorneys with whom the surveyed attorney had 
discussed the topic. Hence, this survey should represent the views of more than the fifty-
three attorneys surveyed. When some of the surveyed attorneys reported that I might get 
different answers, the differences they mentioned generally went to likelihood of forming 
LLCs in a state other than the state of the LLC’s principal place of business, rather than 
the reasons for this decision. 
192 In order to encourage maximum participation by allowing maximum convenience, I 
gave attorneys who indicated a willingness to participate a choice between the telephone 
interview and filling out the survey in writing. Of those who chose to respond in writing, 
ten filled out the survey while seven sent written comments in lieu of filling out the entire 
survey. 
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sample provides useful information to guide larger studies, rather than 
seeking to provide statistically significant results itself. Specifically, 
this sample should be sufficient to provide a broad set of hypotheses 
as to possible motivational factors for state of formation choices and 
to suggest factual variables to test those hypotheses. In addition, it 
should be sufficient either to suggest confirmation that a statistically 
significant correlation does reflect causation or to raise doubts on that 
score, as well as to warn when the failure to obtain a statistically 
significant correlation might reflect limitations of the correlation 
study. In short, this sample should be sufficient to guide statistically 
rigorous investigations toward more robust results. 
2.  The Survey Questions 
The survey questions are found in the Appendix to this Article. 
These questions reflect not only academic literature on LLCs and 
state of formation choices, but also the results of an open-ended pilot 
interview I conducted with an attorney who has aided clients in 
forming numerous LLCs and was gracious enough to spend 
considerable time in an unstructured discussion, as well as serving 
later as the “beta test” on the first draft of the survey questions. I 
conducted all of the interviews myself in order to exercise judgment 
in asking follow-up questions or even engaging the surveyed 
attorneys in extended discussion when they were willing, rather than 
using the survey questionnaire as a strict script from which the 
interview could not depart.193 
The first group of questions in the survey sought some basic 
background information. This begins, of course, by confirming that 
the attorney has advised clients in forming LLCs.194 A negative 
answer to this question would, needless to say, result in terminating 
the interview; but the selection process was such that this did not 
happen. The next question sought to identify the clients’ expected 
roles in the newly formed LLCs—in other words, did the clients 
expect to be all the owners, majority owners, managers, or minority 
 
193 Despite my willingness to depart from the script to ask follow-up questions, there 
are numerous points (reflected in the data reported in this Article) at which I decided not to 
ask a follow-up because I concluded it would have unduly taxed the patience of the 
attorney I was interviewing. 
194 Information about the location of the attorney and the identity of his or her law firm 
came from the communication (almost always by email) lining up the interview or written 
survey. 
GEVURTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  12:57 PM 
2012] Why Delaware LLCs? 95 
investors?195 This established the predicate for later questions which 
asked the attorney about the impact of the client’s expected role on 
the state of formation. As discussed above,196 the assumption that 
those expecting to be majority owners or managers choose where to 
form the entity and do so with an eye toward laws reducing minority 
investor protection or prospects for managerial liability provides the 
basis for the race to the bottom thesis. For similar reasons, the third 
question in this series asked whether the LLC intended to solicit 
outside investors following formation. 
The next group of questions looked at the basic facts about the 
choice of state of formation. These include asking in what states the 
clients’ LLCs had their principal places of business, whether any 
clients formed their LLCs under the law of a state other than the states 
in which the companies had their principal places of business, and, if 
so, in what states. The third question in this group was the central 
question for the survey in that it asked the reasons for forming in 
states other than the LLCs’ principal places of business. This sort of 
open-ended question employs a key advantage of the survey 
methodology over the correlation studies, as it does not depend upon 
the researcher already having thought of the answer, and so allows 
answers that suggest hypotheses for further testing.  
The next four questions asked whether four general factors 
influenced the decision to form the LLC in a state other than the state 
of the LLC’s principal place of business. These included: (1) the state 
of the LLC’s principal place of business; (2) the size of the LLC’s 
business; (3) the client’s expected role in the LLC; and (4) whether 
the LLC intended to raise money from outside investors. The last two 
of these factors go to the race to the bottom thesis, as just discussed. 
By contrast, the first factor simply sought information on whether 
some states are more successful than others in retaining in-state 
formation for LLCs whose principal place of business is in the state. 
The second factor sought to confirm the D&S finding (and the normal 
intuition) about the impact of firm size on the decision to form LLCs 
outside the state of their principal place of business. 
The next two groups of questions probed, in more detail, statutes 
and judicial infrastructure as possible grounds for selecting the LLC’s 
 
195 The survey also listed the possibility of representing the LLC as opposed to its 
prospective members or managers (see, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 27, at 29 (discussing 
the concept of representing the entity to be formed rather than the parties expecting to be 
the owners)), and any other possible client. 
196 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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state of formation. There were four basic questions about statutes. The 
first two asked generally whether there were any statutory provisions 
that made it more or less likely that clients would form their LLCs in 
a state with this statutory provision. Again, such open-ended 
questions, while able to prompt responses potentially overlooked by 
the surveyed attorneys in the global question as to why clients formed 
their LLCs in a state other than that of the company’s principal place 
of business, were still such as to elicit responses that did not depend 
upon the researcher already having thought of which statutory 
provisions would be important. 
The other questions about LLC statutes looked at specific 
provisions in Delaware’s LLC act. These provisions were Section 18-
1101, which sets out the policy of the Delaware LLC act as favoring 
maximum freedom of contract and allows the LLC agreement to 
eliminate all fiduciary and other duties except for the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, and Section 18-209, which allows the majority 
in ownership either to amend the agreement or to kick out the 
minority through a merger with a shell entity, barring an explicitly 
contrary provision in the LLC agreement.197 
Based both upon the pilot interview I conducted before developing 
the survey questionnaire and the views of various authorities,198 I 
already had reason to believe that Section 18-1101 might be an 
important factor in the decision to form LLCs under Delaware law. 
Moreover, as a matter of normative interest, both Section 18-1101 and 
Section 18-209 might test the race toward laxity thesis. Indeed, 
because of the advantages discussed earlier199 of the freeze-out 
merger over the freeze-out effectuated through dissolution and 
liquidation, as well as because of the power this provision gives to the 
majority to amend the LLC agreement in a manner that favors the 
majority at the expense of the minority, Section 18-209 seems far 
more significant than the majority dissolution powers tested by D&S. 
A key difference between Sections 18-1101 and 18-209 is that 
Section 18-209 establishes a default rule that members in Delaware 
LLCs can contract around and that members in non-Delaware LLCs 
can contract for, while Section 18-1101 changes what otherwise 
presumably are mandatory fiduciary duty rules into default rules 
subject to contractual waiver—a result that parties can only achieve 
 
197 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 141, at 511–12, 530–32. 
198 See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290–92 (Del. 1999) 
(touting freedom of contract under Delaware’s LLC act as a reason for its popularity). 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 153–58. 
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by forming in a state with the same law. As such, for the reasons 
discussed above,200 one would expect Section 18-1101 to have a far 
greater impact on choice of state of formation than Section 18-209. 
Still, if one is going to ask about a default rule, Section 18-209 
seemed an interesting one to choose. This is not only because the 
section creates rather strong majority-favoring powers, but also 
because the section creates these powers in a hidden manner. On its 
face, Section 18-209 seems simply to deal with combining firms 
through mergers. Only someone familiar with freeze-out mergers or 
the use of mergers in the corporate context to alter shareholder 
rights201 is likely to recognize the power Section 18-209 grants the 
majority to kick out the minority or alter the minority’s rights.202 To 
top it off, avoiding this default rule requires an “explicitly contrary” 
provision in the LLC agreement—meaning that provisions in an LLC 
agreement demanding unanimous vote for expulsion or for amending 
the agreement might not preclude the majority from using a merger to 
freeze out the minority or amend the LLC agreement if the expulsion 
or amendment provisions in the LLC agreement did not specifically 
refer to mergers. Hence, if there are majority owners trying to use 
default rules to slip in powers that they suspect minority investors 
would reject if placed in the LLC agreement, Section 18-209 seems to 
be a good candidate. 
The specific questions regarding Sections 18-1101 and 18-209 
asked if these sections impacted the decision of clients to form their 
LLCs in Delaware and, if so, whether this depended upon the 
expected role of the client in the LLC. Again, the client role question 
is to test a key assumption underlying the race to the bottom thesis. In 
addition, the questions elicited information on whether these 
provisions impacted the language of LLC agreements. With respect to 
Section 18-1101, this included asking whether the agreements for the 
clients’ Delaware LLCs contained waivers of fiduciary or other duties 
and whether the same language occurs in the agreements governing 
the clients’ non-Delaware LLCs. Along somewhat similar lines, the 
questions into the impact of Section 18-209 sought to determine 
whether the clients’ Delaware LLCs contracted out of Section 18-
209’s default rule by limiting the majority’s power to merge, freeze-
out the minority, or amend the contract, or whether agreements 
 
200 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
201 See, e.g., Bove v. Cmty. Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969). 
202 E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 141, at 534. 
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governing the clients’ non-Delaware LLCs created the equivalent to 
Section 18-209’s default rule. The goal is to go beyond looking at 
what motivated selection of Delaware as the state of formation for 
LLCs and at least begin an inquiry into the impact, including the 
potentially unintended impact, of this choice. 
If the surveyed attorney included the superiority of the Delaware 
judiciary in his or her reasons for forming LLCs in Delaware, I asked 
the attorney a group of questions designed to ascertain the sources by 
which the attorney came to view the quality of Delaware’s judiciary 
as superior in a context relevant to LLCs.203 The questions asked 
about the attorney’s experience, or the experience of other lawyers 
known to the attorney, in litigation in the courts of Delaware or in 
other states, which involved the internal affairs of noncorporate 
entities (such as LLCs) or nonpublic corporations. The questions also 
asked the attorney about judicial opinions he or she has read from 
Delaware or other states dealing with the internal affairs of 
noncorporate entities and nonpublic corporations. An open-ended 
question asking the attorney for any other sources by which he or she 
formed an impression as to the quality of the Delaware judiciary 
when it came to dealing with the internal affairs of LLCs rounded out 
this line of inquiry. The goal of this series of questions is to see the 
extent to which Delaware is trading on general reputation transferred 
unthinkingly from its prominence in the public corporate law context. 
As the final question in the group triggered by the surveyed 
attorney’s invocation of Delaware’s judicial superiority, I asked 
whether the LLC agreements of the clients’ Delaware LLCs contained 
a forum selection clause choosing Delaware courts for litigation under 
the contract. This question gave some insight on how far the attorney 
would go to ensure that any litigation involving the internal affairs of 
the clients’ Delaware LLCs ended up in the Delaware courts, since, 
without such a provision, there is no rule that litigation involving the 
internal affairs of a Delaware LLC can only occur in Delaware.204 
Finally, there were some wrap up questions asking whether the 
attorney had discussed the topic of state of formation of LLCs with 
other attorneys at his or her law firm or more broadly. If so, I asked 
 
203 If, however, the attorney viewed Delaware’s superiority solely in terms of having a 
larger number of relevant decisions—thereby providing the attorney more guidance—
without regard to the quality of the decisions, then I did not ask the attorney the questions 
on the Delaware judiciary. 
204 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-111 (West 2012) (actions to enforce or 
interpret LLC agreement “may” be brought in Delaware Chancery Court). 
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the attorney whether he or she would expect such attorneys to give 
similar answers—thereby trying by hearsay to broaden the reach of 
the survey—and, if he or she expected different answers, for referrals 
of attorneys with different views (thereby creating something of a 
“snowball sample”). The final question in the survey extended an 
open invitation for any other comments. 
B.  Results 
1.  Basic Answers on State of Formation Choices 
The principal places of business for the LLCs covered by this 
survey span the United States. Specifically, while some of the 
surveyed attorneys reported that all of their clients’ LLCs had their 
principal places of business in the attorney’s home state—which, as 
discussed above,205 covers twenty-three states in all regions of the 
country—most of the surveyed attorneys also reported forming LLCs 
to operate businesses outside the attorney’s home state.206 As a result, 
the survey was sufficient to capture information on state of formation 
choices involving LLCs from most states.207 
Figure 3 shows the choices for state of LLC formation reported by 
the surveyed attorneys. 
  
 
205 See supra text accompanying note 190. 
206 To be precise, of the forty-seven attorneys responding to the question, only ten 
reported exclusively aiding clients in forming LLCs whose principal place of business was 
in the attorney’s home state. 
207 Because ten of the attorneys reported that they aided forming LLCs with principal 
places of business “all over the United States” or, in a couple cases, all over either the 
“Eastern” or “Western” United States, it is difficult to be precise on this score. The states 
specifically listed by surveyed attorneys as the locations of the principal place of business 
for their clients’ LLCs include, in addition to the states shown on Figure 1 as the attorneys’ 
home states, the following: Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, and Wyoming. 
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FIGURE 3. 
 
 
Only three attorneys reported forming their clients’ LLCs 
exclusively in the state of the LLC’s principal place of business. As 
discussed above,208 however, this low figure may be the result of 
selection bias. In fact, a number of the interviewed attorneys reported 
that other lawyers they knew were less likely to form LLCs outside 
the state of the company’s principal place of business.209 
Delaware was the overwhelming favorite when it came to selecting 
a state, other than the state of the LLC’s principal place of business, 
in which to form the clients’ LLCs. Forty-nine of the fifty attorneys 
who had some clients form LLCs in states other than that of the 
company’s principal place of business reported Delaware as at least 
one of the states chosen for this role. Moreover, most of the surveyed 
attorneys who reported that some of their clients formed LLCs in 
states other than either Delaware or the state of the LLC’s principal 
place of business reported that Delaware was the usual choice when it 
came to selecting a state in which to form the company other than the 
state of the LLC’s principal place of business.210 
Nevada was the next runner-up, with eleven attorneys reporting 
that sometimes their clients had formed Nevada LLCs for businesses 
 
208 See supra text accompanying note 190. 
209 I heard this comment from five attorneys. Two attorneys, however, expressed the 
view that they were less likely to push for Delaware formation than some other attorneys 
they knew. 
210 Specifically, fourteen of the surveyed attorneys, whose clients formed LLCs in 
states other than either the state of the company’s principal place of business or Delaware, 
stated that Delaware was the usual choice when their clients formed LLCs in states other 
than the state of the company’s principal place of business, while five attorneys listed both 
Delaware and Nevada without indicating that Delaware predominated over Nevada. 
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outside of Nevada.211 On occasion, surveyed attorneys reported 
forming their clients’ LLCs in states other than the state of the 
company’s principal place of business when the state of formation 
was the attorney’s home state,212 the home state of an investor in the 
LLC,213 the state within which the LLC held real estate,214 or based 
upon some other rationale.215 
As discussed earlier,216 the survey asked whether any of four 
general factors—state of the principal place of business, size of the 
business, client’s expected role in the LLC, and intent to bring in 
outside investors after formation—impacted the decision to form the 
clients’ LLCs in a state other than the state of the LLC’s principal 
place of business. Size of the business and intent to bring in outside 
investors after formation produced the most definitive answers. 
Specifically, a solid majority answered consistently with the D&S 
finding (and the normal intuition) that larger LLCs might form 
outside the state of the principal place of business (mainly in 
Delaware), while smaller (“mom and pop”) businesses formed LLCs 
in the state of their principal place of business.217 A larger majority of 
the surveyed attorneys reported that the intent to raise money from 
outside investors after formation increased the chance of forming the 
LLC in a state other than the state of the company’s principal place of 
business, especially in Delaware.218 
 
211 In the last decade, amendments to Nevada’s corporate law that insulate directors 
from liability to a greater extent than the law in Delaware have spawned an increase in 
Nevada incorporation. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a 
Liability-free Jurisdiction (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 2011-07, 2011), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1920538. Because Delaware was the 
far-more-frequent choice in forming LLCs—even in most cases for attorneys whose 
clients had also formed Nevada LLCs—the interviews never got into the reasons for 
clients choosing to form Nevada LLCs. Indeed, a couple of the surveyed attorneys 
volunteered that forming LLCs under Nevada law was their clients’ idea and the attorneys 
did not favor the choice. 
212 Three attorneys reported this. 
213 Three attorneys reported this. 
214 Three attorneys reported this. 
215 Two attorneys reported this. For example, one East Coast attorney was impressed 
with the South Dakota statute. Go figure. 
216 See supra text in paragraph after note 196. 
217 Twenty-six of the surveyed attorneys reported this, while fifteen of the surveyed 
attorneys answered that size did not matter. 
218 Twenty-eight of the surveyed attorneys reported this, while six of the surveyed 
attorneys answered that this factor did not matter. (There were fewer responses in total to 
this question than to the question regarding the impact of size because a number of the 
surveyed attorneys had not represented clients in forming LLCs that planned to raise 
money from outside investors.) 
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Reactions to the two other general factors were more mixed. Some 
of the surveyed attorneys mentioned a number of states in which they 
would recommend their clients not form LLCs. These included New 
York (with six attorneys listing it as a state to stay away from219), 
California (also with six attorneys listing it as a state to stay away 
from220), Florida (with five attorneys listing it as a state to avoid221), 
Tennessee (with three attorneys condemning it222), and South 
Carolina (with two attorneys recommending avoiding it). Alabama, 
Connecticut, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, and 
Wisconsin each attracted a single attorney’s disparagement; albeit one 
cannot draw too much of a conclusion from an isolated attorney’s 
comment. During the course of their answers to other questions, the 
surveyed attorneys from some states (such as Illinois) seemed 
inclined to complain about their state’s LLC law, while the surveyed 
attorneys from some states (such as North Carolina) seemed inclined 
to defend their state’s LLC law and legal infrastructure. It is difficult 
to say how much of this reflected widely shared perceptions of the 
differences in the LLC laws and legal infrastructure in these states, 
and how much of this simply reflects different attitudes among 
attorneys regarding various features of LLC law and the degree of 
bias toward the attorney’s home state. 
Turning to the impact of the client’s expected role on state of 
formation, I asked, as explained earlier,223 whom the attorneys had 
represented when forming LLCs—in other words, had they ever 
represented clients expecting to be the sole owners, to be majority 
owners, to be managers, or to be minority investors (or was the client 
the LLC or someone else). The bulk (thirty-five out of forty-six) of 
the attorneys responding to this question reported that at various times 
their clients had fit all of these categories. When combined with those 
reporting narrower experience, all but two of the forty-six attorneys 
 
219 With the exception of a complaint about New York’s publication requirement—
which entails extra fees—the attorneys did not give many specific grounds for their 
complaints about New York. 
220 As was the case with New York, the attorneys criticizing California typically were 
not very specific as to their reasons. Among the most specific was the comment that 
California’s default rules were “not intuitive.” 
221 One attorney characterized Florida’s statute as “weird,” while another complained 
about the state’s LLC law regarding fiduciary duty and the remedies available to personal 
creditors of the members (beyond simply charging orders). 
222 Two attorneys characterized Tennessee’s statute as “weird,” and the attorneys 
disliked Tennessee’s mandatory provisions and default provisions that were difficult to 
contract around. 
223 See supra text accompanying note 196. 
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responding to this question had experience representing all of the 
prospective owners of the LLC, and the same number had experience 
representing parties planning to own a majority of, but not all, 
interests in the company. A total of forty of the attorneys reported 
experience having represented clients expecting to manage the LLCs 
even if they did not own a majority. A total of thirty-seven of the 
surveyed attorneys reported that, at one time or another, they had 
represented clients who expected to be minority investors in the LLC, 
rather than representing clients expecting to be managers or majority 
owners, or representing all the owners (although many of these 
attorneys added that representing minority investors was the 
exception in their practice). This established the predicate for 
questions that sought to determine whether state of formation choices 
were different when the attorney represented those expecting to be 
managers and majority owners, versus when representing prospective 
minority investors.224 
I asked every attorney who gave more than one answer to the 
question about the clients’ expected role whether the client’s expected 
role impacted the likelihood of the LLC being formed in a state other 
than the state in which the LLC had its principal place of business. 
The answers were fairly closely divided. Twenty-two attorneys 
reported that the expected role of the client at least sometimes made a 
difference, while eighteen stated that it did not. Two of the attorneys, 
who said that their representation of prospective minority investors 
did not impact the state of formation of the LLC, explained, however, 
that this was because the prospective managers or majority owners 
made the decision of where to form the LLC. Fourteen of the 
attorneys who stated that the client’s expected role made a difference 
elaborated that they would prefer to form in Delaware if they 
represented majority owners or managers, and they would prefer their 
home state if they represented minority investors; albeit five attorneys 
 
224 Representing all of the prospective members also could produce a different result in 
terms of state of formation from just representing managers or majority members. This, 
however, raises the delicate conflict-of-interest problem facing the attorney who represents 
both prospective minority and majority members in an LLC. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 & cmts. 8, 28 (2010) (discussing conflicts of interest in 
representing multiple parties in forming a business). By and large, the surveyed attorneys 
did not separately consider the impact of representing all members—except two who 
reported that this led to formation in the state of the principal place of business—and I did 
not press the issue. 
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saw it the other way (and three attorneys raised other impacts of the 
clients’ expected role225). 
2.  Overview of Expressed Reasons for Selecting Delaware 
Figure 4 presents the primary reasons given by attorneys for 
selecting Delaware as the state of formation for LLCs.226 Frequency 
is measured here in terms of how many attorneys invoked a factor. 
This does not necessarily mean that the factors invoked by more 
attorneys impacted more LLCs. It is always possible that a large 
fraction of the surveyed attorneys might invoke a factor that impacted 
only a few of their clients’ LLCs—particularly if this factor was 
highly memorable rather than typical. On the other hand, the factors 
most often mentioned did not seem to have anything dramatic about 
them that would suggest the interviewees confused the memorable 
with the typical. (The danger in survey research of interviewees 
confusing what was memorable with what is more typical in their 
experience might have been a problem if dealing with transactions 
that were much less frequent and involved much more highly 
contextualized decisions than choice of state of formation for LLCs.) 
  
 
225 For example, if they represented all of the expected members, then they would 
favor the state of the LLC’s principal place of business. 
226 Not surprisingly, most attorneys listed more than one reason for establishing 
LLCs in Delaware, so the total number of responses in Figure 3 is greater than the number 
of surveyed attorneys whose clients established Delaware LLCs. 
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FIGURE 4. 
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reasons for establishing LLCs in Delaware. 
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third and one-quarter of the surveyed attorneys whose clients formed 
Delaware LLCs. 
Fewer attorneys invoked other reasons for their clients forming 
LLCs in Delaware and the other reasons typically received little 
emphasis even from these attorneys. Eight attorneys mentioned the 
impact of the choice on minority member rights (other than through 
flexibility of contract and fiduciary duty waiver); albeit, as discussed 
later,227 these comments often only came about in response to specific 
questions about Delaware’s freeze-out merger provision. Five 
attorneys invoked the overall quality of Delaware’s LLC statute, 
although an equal number criticized the same. Five attorneys 
mentioned several different possible tax advantages to forming under 
Delaware law.228 Four attorneys listed unspecified company 
governance provisions of Delaware’s LLC act as advantageous. Two 
attorneys mentioned Delaware’s enforcement of oral LLC 
agreements229 as a potentially positive (or negative) factor. Two 
attorneys invoked Delaware’s allowance of flexible capital structures 
in LLCs.230 Two attorneys stated that lenders had demanded 
Delaware formation. Two attorneys raised the enforceability of 
contractual penalties (for example, for failing to meet capital calls as 
required by the contract).231 Two attorneys mentioned provisions in 
Delaware’s statute allowing non-LLCs to convert to LLCs (and vice 
versa),232 while another attorney mentioned the availability of 
mergers between LLCs and other types of business entities.233 One 
attorney mentioned the permissibility of single-person LLCs in 
Delaware as a factor.234 One attorney mentioned the enforceability 
under Delaware law of noncompetition provisions in the LLC 
agreement.235 One attorney mentioned Delaware’s allowing waiver of 
 
227 See infra text accompanying notes 244 and 246–47. 
228 It was often unclear whether these tax advantages are perceived or real. 
229 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (West 2012). 
230 Id. §§ 18-503, -504. It is not clear that this differs, however, from other states’ LLC 
acts. 
231 Id. §§ 18-306, -502(c). 
232 Id. § 18-214. 
233 Id. § 18-209(a), (b). 
234 Id. § 18-101(6). 
235 See O’Leary v. Telecom Res. Serv., LLC, No. 10C-03-108-JOH, 2011 WL 379300, 
at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://www.courts.state.de.us/opinions 
/download.aspx?ID=150060 (holding that a non-compete clause barring plaintiff from 
rendering services to a competitive business anywhere in the United States for a period of 
four years is not invalid as a matter of law). Whether Delaware law is really that different 
from other states on non-competition agreements in the LLC context is not clear. 
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dissenter’s rights.236 One attorney pointed to the convenience (in 
terms of managing annual filings) of LLCs that were wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Delaware public corporations also formed under 
Delaware law. 
In sum, putting aside for the most part the more isolated rationales, 
the reasons for forming Delaware LLCs expressed by the surveyed 
attorneys fall into two broad camps. There are a variety of 
infrastructure advantages possessed by Delaware. There are also 
substantive rules of Delaware law that impact minority investors and 
creditors. The next two sections of this Article explore the attorneys’ 
answers about these rationales in more detail. 
3.  Legal and Other Infrastructure 
The survey results are generally consistent with the academic legal 
literature and some of the findings of the statistical correlation studies 
in suggesting the importance of legal infrastructure to Delaware’s 
attractiveness as a state of formation for LLCs. These results, 
however, suggest that this is much more complicated than simple 
metrics of judicial quality or statutory typicality. 
To begin with, as shown in Figure 5, the interviews established that 
the attorneys, who invoked the Delaware judiciary as at least one 
reason for their clients forming LLCs in Delaware, actually had in 
mind any of three distinct rationales. 
FIGURE 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 Actually, appraisal rights only exist under the Delaware act if the agreement 
provides for them. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-210 (West 2012). 
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One rationale, invoked by seventeen attorneys, corresponds to the 
original network rationale developed in the academic literature 
dealing with state of formation choices by public corporations.237 
Delaware simply has more court opinions on LLC law—even after 
two decades of the entity’s presence in Delaware—or at least has 
more court opinions relevant to LLC law when one also counts 
corporate law opinions likely, in the view of a number of surveyed 
attorneys, to apply by analogy. Hence, the attorney has a greater 
chance of finding an opinion by a Delaware court on a given issue, 
thereby establishing greater certainty for the attorney. A different 
rationale, invoked by twelve attorneys, is that Delaware court 
opinions are better reasoned—regardless of the quantity of opinions 
or whether the attorney agrees with or prefers the substantive result. 
In this instance, the advantage for the attorney is greater clarity and 
predictability in the law. Finally, a third rationale, invoked by fifteen 
attorneys, is that it would be preferable to have any litigation between 
the LLC’s members and managers occur in Delaware courts. This 
may be either because of the sophistication of Delaware judges in 
matters of business law or because of the efficiency with which 
Delaware courts dispatch business litigation. 
A series of follow-up questions provides some insight into the 
sources of information used by the attorneys who invoked the 
rationales going to the qualitative superiority of the Delaware 
judiciary (rather than simply more case law). The dominant source 
appears to be, not surprisingly, reading opinions of Delaware courts 
relevant to LLC law. All of these attorneys, when asked, reported that 
they had read Delaware court opinions dealing with the internal 
affairs of LLCs or nonpublic corporations, and virtually all gave a 
positive evaluation of the Delaware court opinions they had read. 
Typical comments included “thoughtful,” “more sophisticated,” 
“more savvy,” “thorough and well analyzed,” and “don’t hear [from 
Delaware judges] ‘limited liability corporation’ [for limited liability 
company] or ‘shareholder’ [instead of member].” Of course, the state 
of formation decision is a comparative one, and so it is not surprising 
that the second-most common source of information appears to be 
reading the opinions of the attorney’s home state’s courts relevant to 
LLC law. Twelve of seventeen attorneys answered in the affirmative 
when asked if they had read opinions of non-Delaware courts—which 
the attorneys generally took as referring to courts in their home 
 
237 See Klausner, supra note 15, at 842–47. 
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state—dealing with the internal affairs of LLCs or nonpublic 
corporations. The smaller number versus those who have read 
Delaware court opinions reflects the lack of reported opinions from 
courts in some of the attorneys’ home states, which, in turn, supports 
the quantitative rationale (more relevant case law) for favoring the 
Delaware judiciary. The attorneys’ evaluations of opinions from the 
courts of their home states relevant to LLC law were almost 
invariably inferior to their evaluations of Delaware court opinions. 
Typical comments were “not as good [as Delaware],” “uneven,” or 
“mixed.” 
Few of the attorneys (only three) who invoked the qualitative 
superiority of the Delaware judiciary had, or knew an attorney who 
had, litigated cases in Delaware courts involving the internal affairs of 
LLCs or nonpublic corporations. This illustrates how indirect the 
sources are by which numerous attorneys came to believe that 
Delaware judges would actually be better in deciding cases involving 
LLCs. More (nine) of the surveyed attorneys who invoked the 
qualitative superiority of the Delaware judiciary had, or knew 
attorneys who had, litigated LLC or nonpublic corporation cases in 
their home states’ courts. These attorneys generally were 
uncomplimentary in their evaluations from experiences litigating in 
their home states. Comments ranged from the sly “no comment” or 
“well intentioned,” to the blunt “crappy” or “slow and often wrong.” 
Ten of the attorneys who invoked the qualitative superiority of the 
Delaware judiciary mentioned other sources of information they used 
in reaching this conclusion. Some of these included simply the 
existence of the Delaware Chancery Court and the greater experience 
with business cases this creates, or that their home state courts follow 
Delaware decisions. One of the more interesting sources, mentioned 
by five attorneys, to those in the legal academy is scholarship (articles 
and presentations) by Delaware judges—showing one practical utility 
to legal scholarship.238 
Eleven of the fifteen surveyed attorneys who desired to have 
Delaware courts decide litigation involving the internal affairs of their 
clients’ LLCs included forum selection clauses in the LLC 
agreements. 
 
238 This supports a thesis by Steven Cleveland as to why Delaware judges engage in 
scholarship. Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law, 
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1842 (2008). 
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Delaware’s infrastructure advantage in the minds of many of the 
surveyed attorneys goes beyond its judiciary. The attorney’s 
knowledge of Delaware law, the ease of establishment in Delaware, 
and Delaware’s reputational cache were among the next tier of 
commonly invoked rationales for forming LLCs in Delaware. 
Eighteen of the surveyed attorneys invoked their knowledge of 
Delaware law as a major reason for forming LLCs in Delaware when 
the principals in the LLC were from different states. A typical pattern 
might involve an LLC with three members—one from State A, one 
from State B, and one from State C—each represented by an attorney 
from the member’s home state. Each member’s attorney is familiar 
with the law in his or her own state, but unfamiliar with the law in the 
other members’ home states. Each attorney is hesitant to form the 
LLC under the law of a state with which he or she is not intimately 
familiar, lest there be some unknown rule that will disadvantage his or 
her client. Because all three attorneys are also familiar, however, with 
Delaware LLC law, the parties agree on forming in Delaware as 
“neutral ground.” 
As shown in Figure 6, the sixteen surveyed attorneys who invoked 
ease of establishment as a reason for forming LLCs in Delaware 
actually represent a conglomeration of attorneys who raised several 
more specific reasons. 
FIGURE 6. 
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The most common reason, invoked by eight of these attorneys, was 
the superior service provided by the Delaware Secretary of State’s 
office. This office could establish the LLC the day after filing for an 
extra $100, the same day for an extra $200, or even in an hour for an 
extra $1000 charge.239 By contrast, the California Secretary of State 
is so understaffed that a couple of the interviewees had experienced a 
multi-week delay between filing and the actual formation of a 
California LLC. Seven attorneys pointed to the fact that Delaware did 
not require disclosure of the names of the LLC’s members, thereby 
providing more privacy for LLC members.240 A couple of attorneys 
mentioned lower fees in Delaware,241 while one attorney mentioned 
private infrastructure (corporate service firms and the like). 
Thirteen of the surveyed attorneys invoked yet a different sort of 
infrastructure advantage possessed by Delaware. This was the 
“prestige” or “brand” value associated with being a Delaware LLC. 
The surveyed attorneys did not associate this with any particular 
feature of Delaware’s law or legal infrastructure, but rather they 
viewed this just as a general reputational cache associated with 
formation in Delaware. This was particularly important in the context 
of LLCs seeking investors from outside the state of the LLC’s 
principal place of business, who, to repeat the expression used by one 
surveyed attorney, would view formation in the state of the LLC’s 
principal place of business as “rinky dink.” 
Five attorneys mentioned advantages of the overall Delaware LLC 
statute among the reasons for their clients forming Delaware LLCs. 
Specifically, four pointed to the statute being kept up to date, while 
one mentioned fewer political provisions.242 Interestingly, an equal 
number of attorneys criticized the general quality of the Delaware 
statute, finding it poorly written. 
 
239 DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS FEE SCHEDULE 
(2009), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/Aug09feesch.pdf. 
240 To deal with states that require disclosure of members of foreign LLCs registering 
to do business in the state, one attorney explained that his clients formed Delaware LLCs 
to act as members of the LLCs that would have their principal place of business in those 
states. 
241 This seems to ignore, however, the prospect of a high-fee state, such as California, 
charging Delaware LLCs the same high fees when the Delaware LLCs must, because they 
have their principal place of business within the high-fee state, qualify to do business in 
the high-fee state. 
242 This attorney contrasted Delaware with his state, in which the legislature enacted or 
threatened to enact provisions in the LLC statute in order to deal with “hot button” 
political issues—for example, cancelling the charter of any LLC found to be employing 
undocumented workers. 
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4.  Creditor and Minority Investor Protections 
a.  Minority Member Protections 
As predicted in the race to the bottom debate, a number of 
rationales given by the surveyed attorneys for their clients forming 
Delaware LLCs involve creditor and minority investor protections. 
The far most common of these rationales was the freedom of contract 
and the ability to waive fiduciary duties provided by Section 18-1101 
of Delaware’s LLC statute. A total of thirty attorneys mentioned this. 
Having a question on the survey specifically ask about Section 18-
1101 introduces the potential for biasing the responses. In response to 
the question of whether Section 18-1101 impacted the choice to form 
Delaware LLCs, thirty attorneys replied in the affirmative (or had 
already said this), while fifteen attorneys replied in the negative. (One 
attorney who replied in the affirmative said it was a factor, but 
worked differently from everyone else’s because his home state’s law 
allowed broader waivers. One other attorney was uncertain.) Still, 
twenty-three of the thirty attorneys who invoked this reason for 
clients forming LLCs in Delaware did so prior to being asked the 
specific question about Section 18-1101. Moreover, only six attorneys 
gave an affirmative reply when asked if Section 18-209 (the merger 
provision) impacted the choice to form LLCs in Delaware, with 
thirty-six replying in the negative—suggesting that merely asking 
about a particular section does not trigger a large number of 
affirmative responses. 
Interestingly, of the fifteen attorneys who stated that Section 18-
1101 did not impact the choice of whether to form their clients’ LLCs 
in Delaware, eight explained that this was because the state of the 
LLCs’ principal place of business had essentially the same provision 
in its LLC statute. 
The fact that Delaware seems to be attracting formation of LLCs 
by a statutory provision favoring freedom of contract and allowing 
waiver of fiduciary duties suggests a “race to laxity” or flexibility, but 
not necessarily a “race to the bottom.” It could be, as a number of the 
surveyed attorneys asserted, that such waivers and any other 
contractual terms allowed by Section 18-1101 represent the desired 
outcomes for sophisticated parties forming LLCs. Here is where the 
questions regarding the impact of the client’s expected role in the 
LLC come into play. Specifically, if fiduciary duty waivers or other 
terms allowed by virtue of Section 18-1101’s freedom of contract are 
mutually beneficial, then the desire to form Delaware LLCs because 
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of Section 18-1101 presumably should not depend upon the expected 
role of the client—specifically, whether the client expected to be a 
manager or majority owner, versus a minority investor. Yet, of the 
thirty attorneys who stated that Section 18-1101 impacted the 
decision to form LLCs in Delaware, seventeen attorneys responded in 
the affirmative when asked if this depended upon the client’s 
expected role, while only seven attorneys stated it did not matter.243 
Section 18-1101 had a mixed impact on the agreements governing 
the clients’ Delaware LLCs. Thirty attorneys reported that the LLC 
agreements governing their clients’ Delaware LLCs contained 
provisions waiving some or all fiduciary duties, while twelve 
attorneys reported that the agreements did not contain such 
provisions. This, of course, does not establish that the agreements 
would have been different if the clients did not form their LLCs in 
Delaware. With respect to that question, nineteen attorneys reported 
that, because of Section 18-1101, the agreements governing their 
clients’ Delaware LLCs had different provisions than the agreements 
governing their clients’ non-Delaware LLCs. This generally meant 
more complete waivers than the LLC agreements for the non-
Delaware LLCs; as one attorney put it, Section 18-1101 encouraged 
agreements to “push the envelope.” On the other hand, twenty-one 
attorneys reported that there was no difference in the language of their 
clients’ LLC agreements because of Section 18-1101.244 Three of 
these attorneys explained that this was because the LLC statute of the 
principal place of business of their clients’ LLCs has a provision 
equivalent to Section 18-1101. Two other attorneys reported that, 
while the agreements’ language did not change because of Section 18-
1101, the impact of the agreement could be different. This was 
because the agreements contained provisions waiving fiduciary duties 
“to the extent allowed by law.” Three attorneys reported that, while 
the agreements for their clients’ Delaware and non-Delaware LLCs 
used the same waiver language, the attorney did so recognizing that 
the waiver might not be valid for the non-Delaware LLCs. 
Relatively few of the surveyed attorneys (only six) responded in 
the affirmative when asked if Section 18-209 (allowing the majority 
to freeze out the minority or to amend the LLC agreement through a 
merger) impacted the decision to form their clients’ LLCs in 
 
 
243 Five stated that they only represented clients expecting to be managers or majority 
owners, and one attorney was uncertain. 
244 Two attorneys were uncertain. 
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Delaware.245 Even then, the salience of this factor could not have 
been large, as no attorney raised this as a reason for forming LLCs in 
Delaware before the specific question about the section. Of those who 
responded in the affirmative when asked if this Section impacted the 
choice to form their clients’ LLCs in Delaware, three also responded 
in the affirmative when asked if this depended upon the client’s 
expected role in the LLC, while only one responded that it did not.246 
Of the thirty-six attorneys who viewed Section 18-209 as 
unimportant to the choice of state of formation, many volunteered the 
explanation that this was because they could simply contract around 
it. Interestingly, however, a number of the attorneys’ answers about 
provisions in their clients’ LLC agreements raised doubts as to 
whether the LLC agreements had, in fact, always contracted around 
the difference between Delaware and non-Delaware law created by 
Section 18-209. It is difficult to be too specific here, because I did not 
examine the LLC agreements, and it turned out to be challenging to 
do justice to this subject in an interview. This said, my best 
interpretation of the answers—and generally giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the attorneys who claimed to have eliminated the impact of 
Section 18-209 by contract—is that Section 18-209 seems to have 
produced different rights in the clients’ Delaware LLCs versus non-
Delaware LLCs for eleven of the surveyed attorneys, while seventeen 
attorneys seem (giving them the benefit of the doubt in many 
instances) to have achieved parity between Delaware and non-
Delaware LLCs despite Section 18-209. (In other cases, the answers 
were insufficient even to guess.) In the cases in which attorneys 
appeared to have achieved parity—and the parity did not vary with 
every deal—it appears that slightly more attorneys (eight) had their 
clients’ Delaware LLCs contract around Section 18-209 than had their 
clients’ non-Delaware LLCs contract for the equivalent of Section 18-
209 (six). 
A few of the surveyed attorneys raised a couple of other rationales 
dealing with minority member rights for forming their clients’ LLCs 
in Delaware. A couple of attorneys stated that minority members had 
less right to information from the LLC under Delaware law.247 A 
 
245 In one instance, this involved moving an existing LLC’s state of formation from the 
state of its principal place of business to Delaware precisely in order to take advantage of 
Section 18-209. 
246 The remaining two did not provide answers. 
247 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(g) (2012) (allowing LLC agreement to restrict 
rights to information). 
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couple of attorneys stated that minority members had less ability to 
pursue an action for oppression under Delaware law.248 
b.  Creditor Protections 
Seventeen attorneys included rules limiting the protection of 
creditors among the reasons the attorneys gave for their clients 
forming LLCs in Delaware. While the common theme was to favor 
the interests of members over creditors, different attorneys found 
different rules dealing with creditor rights, as shown in Figure 7, 
important to this choice. 
 
FIGURE 7. 
 
Eight attorneys pointed to the limitations established by 
Delaware’s statute on the rights of creditors of members (as well as 
the rights of other transferees of membership interests) as a reason for 
forming LLCs in Delaware. Specifically, Delaware’s statute gives 
creditors of members only the ability to seek a charging order, which 
simply allows the creditor to obtain distributions from the company 
when and if the company makes such distributions.249 This is 
advantageous to the remaining owners, who need not worry that a 
member’s creditor might obtain the management or other rights that a 
shareholder’s creditor could obtain in a corporation by seizing the 
stock of the debtor-shareholder. It is worth noting, however, that this 
limitation on rights of the members’ personal creditors might also 
protect the interest of the LLC’s creditors. While the LLC statutes of 
 
248 See id. § 18-802 (providing judicial dissolution “whenever it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with a limited liability company 
agreement,” but not providing dissolution for oppression). 
249 Id. § 18-703. 
GEVURTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  12:57 PM 
116 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 57 
states other than Delaware also limit the rights of the members’ 
creditors and of transferees of membership interests,250 a number of 
the surveyed attorneys stated that Delaware has some specific 
advantages in this area. For example, Delaware’s LLC act expressly 
overrides UCC provisions that might otherwise trump restrictions on 
transfer of security interests in property, including a member’s 
interest in an LLC, and thereby arguably allow a member’s secured 
creditors to claim rights beyond a charging order.251 Two of the 
surveyed attorneys mentioned Delaware’s approval for what they 
labeled “springing” members—in other words, members who will not 
make a contribution to, and will not have any economic interest in, 
the LLC252—as an advantage of Delaware LLCs. As mentioned 
earlier,253 this closes the possible gap in the protection against claims 
by the members’ personal creditors, which arises if the personal 
creditors could obtain all the economic interests in the LLC and seek 
to dissolve the company. 
Six attorneys invoked the availability of series LLCs as a reason 
for forming LLCs in Delaware. As discussed earlier,254 the utility of 
the series LLCs (such as it is) involves arguably decreasing the 
prospects for piercing the veil of limited liability between commonly 
owned LLCs, and, hence, is a device to limit protection of creditors. 
Two attorneys mentioned lesser prospects more generally for 
piercing the veil of limited liability under Delaware law. Since 
Delaware does not have a provision stating that the failure to follow 
meeting formalities will not lead to piercing (which is what D&S 
tested), the rationale of these attorneys is obviously different than that 
tested by D&S. One attorney pointed to California’s statute, which 
provides that LLC owners will face the same danger of piercing as 
shareholders—except that failure to follow meeting formalities will 
not lead to piercing unless the LLC agreement calls for meetings.255 
This attorney’s concern was not the negative pregnant in the caveat 
about LLC agreements that require meetings, but more generally the 
view that, by even raising the piercing issue, the California statute 
 
250 E.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 120, § 7:8. 
251 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(g). See also id. § 18-103(c) (excluding interests in 
limited liability companies from the definition of “security” for purposes of Article 8 of 
the UCC with certain limited exceptions). 
252 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(d). 
253 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 177–82 and accompanying text. 
255 CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2011). 
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will encourage it in LLCs. The other attorney simply felt that 
Delaware courts would be less inclined to pierce. 
Two attorneys were worried that members in an LLC in their home 
state would have more apparent authority to bind the firm to contracts 
with third parties than they would have in Delaware.256 Two attorneys 
felt there was less potential under Delaware law that members would 
need to return distributions received from LLCs that later could not 
pay their creditors.257 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS AND AN AGENDA FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This survey of attorneys suggests that two factors largely account 
for Delaware’s attractiveness as a state in which to form LLCs: (1) 
legal and other infrastructure advantages; and (2) appealing to those 
who plan to be managers or majority owners of the LLCs. This much 
is consistent with theory and some of the results of the existing 
correlation studies. Yet, the attorney survey reveals a more complete 
story regarding these two factors than previously available. 
To begin with, this survey enables us to reach a more robust 
understanding as to the nature and scope of Delaware’s infrastructure 
advantage than provided just by the correlation studies or the 
theoretical legal literature. On the simplest, but nevertheless a highly 
significant, level, the survey results support Kobayashi and Ribstein 
and undercut Dammann and Schündeln with respect to the role of 
judicial infrastructure in choice of state of formation for LLCs. 
Indeed, the survey results provide direct evidence to support the 
inference of causation, which otherwise was only a tentative 
conclusion from the correlation found between LLC state of 
formation statistics and the various metrics of judicial quality tested 
by K&R. The survey results also seem to undercut the argument that 
the ability of parties in an LLC to provide detailed and tailored rules 
through the LLC agreement undermines the advantage Delaware 
 
256 The basis for the belief that members of an LLC have less apparent authority under 
Delaware law is not entirely clear. See Jack J. Morris Assocs. v. Mispillion St. Partners, 
LLC, No. 07C-04-023-RFS, 2008 WL 3906755, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2008), 
available at http://www.courts.state.de.us/opinions/download.aspx?ID=110540 (denying 
summary judgment because there was a factual dispute concerning whether a member, and 
former manager, of an LLC had the apparent authority to bind the LLC to contracts). 
257 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-607(b) (members liable only if they knew 
distribution was impermissible). 
GEVURTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  12:57 PM 
118 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 57 
obtains from its judicial infrastructure.258 This is probably because 
attorneys recognize that the difficulty of drafting unambiguous and 
prescient contracts to govern long-term relationships, as in LLCs, 
leaves their clients dependent on judicial expertise—albeit these 
results do not show that Delaware could charge the same premium for 
this infrastructure advantage that it is able to do in the public 
corporate context.259 
In addition, the survey results give us a more precise picture of 
what features of Delaware’s judicial infrastructure motivate LLC state 
of formation decisions. As revealed in the survey, some attorneys are 
looking simply at the quantity of relevant case law in Delaware versus 
in other states—a result consistent with the original judicial 
infrastructure thesis in the corporate context and one of the metrics 
tested by K&R. Other attorneys focus, alternatively or additionally, 
on the quality of relevant judicial decisions in Delaware versus other 
states—a metric only obliquely tested by K&R’s use of a judicial 
citation study. Still other attorneys focus, alternatively or additionally, 
on the desirability of actually litigating cases in the Delaware court 
system—a metric consistent with some of the academic literature,260 
but not tested particularly by either correlation study. No attorney 
seems interested in punitive damages or the productivity of judges—
the two other metrics tested in the correlation studies. 
While the survey results cannot dispel the suspicion that Delaware 
is, at least to some extent, trading on the reputation its courts had 
already gained in the public corporation context, the survey results 
demonstrate the importance of craftsmanship in writing court 
opinions, as well as the utility of presentations and articles by judges, 
in gaining a reputation for Delaware in the LLC context. 
Delaware’s legal infrastructure advantage, as expounded in the 
survey results, extends beyond its judiciary, suggesting that K&R and 
D&S were too narrow in the variables they tested. One significant 
policy implication of this is to douse the dreams of those who urge 
other states to create specialized business courts in order to compete 
 
258 Manesh, supra note 55, at 234–35. 
259 E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for 
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1217–27 (2001) (discussing Delaware’s 
market power to charge high fees for public corporations). 
260 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589–90 (1990). 
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with Delaware.261 Some of the infrastructure advantages mentioned 
by the surveyed attorneys—particularly the efficient handling of LLC 
filings and the absence of a requirement to disclose publicly the 
names of members—would seem relatively easy for other states to 
duplicate if states had the will and committed the resources. Two 
other infrastructure advantages often mentioned by the surveyed 
attorneys—their knowledge of Delaware LLC law and the 
reputational value of forming in Delaware—would not be easy for 
other states to duplicate. 
The common role that attorneys’ knowledge of Delaware law plays 
in the selection of Delaware as a state of formation for LLCs is 
consistent with other empirical research. Specifically, it is similar to 
the results of a survey of attorneys involved in initial public offerings 
or IPOs, which suggests that attorneys’ knowledge of Delaware law 
plays a critical role in choosing Delaware as the state of incorporation 
for companies going public.262 Delaware’s advantage in providing a 
commonly known law for LLCs formed by parties from different 
states illustrates the utility of uniform business organization acts, but 
also illustrates that a single state’s law can provide the same utility. 
An interesting question beyond the scope of this survey would be to 
explore how legal and business culture comes to accept a particular 
state’s law as the one beyond their home states’ that most attorneys 
learn. By way of example, consider the decision of those who put 
together nationally published materials for law school Business 
Associations courses to use Delaware’s act as the exemplar of an LLC 
statute.263 Did this help create (at least in some small part), or did this 
simply reflect, cultural acceptance?264 
 
261 See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 239, at 1837 (some states are creating business 
courts in order to attract incorporation business); Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business 
Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947 (1997) (advocating for 
business courts). 
262 William J. Carney et al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware 
Corporate Law 27 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 11-171), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1949261. 
263 See, e.g., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: STATUTES, 
RULES, MATERIAL, AND FORMS 338 (Melvin Aron Eisenberg ed., 2010); JEFFREY D. 
BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS STATUTES, RULES AND 
FORMS 1121 (2010). 
264 See Carney et al., supra note 262, at 8 (suggesting that IPO attorneys’ knowledge of 
Delaware law, which leads to incorporation in Delaware, is because law school corporate 
law classes only teach the corporate law of Delaware and perhaps the school’s home state). 
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The survey answers explain why the K&R study found no 
statistically significant results for the various measures of statutory 
typicality. True, a couple attorneys complained of statutes which 
contained provisions they characterized as “weird,”265 but such 
comments were not widespread. Nor were there enough negative 
comments about those states which have adopted the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act to support D&S’s negative 
correlation based upon that variable.266 In any event, given the 
pervasive knowledge of Delaware’s law, Delaware does not need to 
limit its law to provisions typical of other states in order for attorneys 
to be comfortable with its law. 
The surveyed attorneys’ mention of Delaware’s reputational cache, 
particularly with investors, has potential policy implications beyond 
simply dousing the hopes of states that might wish to compete with 
Delaware. Those who believe in the wisdom of markets and the 
merits of brands as a communication of quality—rather than simply 
an exploitation of human irrationality—may argue that this reputation 
shows Delaware’s optimal balancing of managerial, majority, and 
minority investor interests. This is a nice segue into the other primary 
set of reasons for forming Delaware LLCs. 
The surveyed attorneys’ frequent mention of Delaware’s freedom 
of contract and fiduciary duty waiver provisions create a quandary 
when contrasted with the failure of the K&R study to obtain a 
statistically significant correlation between fiduciary duty waiver 
provisions and LLC state of formation choices. It is possible, of 
course, that the attorneys in my survey sample were somehow 
idiosyncratic in their views when it came to this factor. On the other 
hand, this was such a consistent and frequent response that it is 
difficult to imagine that the mention of Section 18-1101 would have 
dropped off dramatically if I continued to interview more attorneys. 
As discussed above,267 K&R’s failure to obtain statistically 
significant correlations with fiduciary duty waiver provisions might 
stem from difficulties in selecting the precise variable for testing. So, 
for example, K&R could have undercut correlation by dividing 
 
265 See supra note 221. 
266 See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text (listing states criticized by the 
surveyed attorneys). Among the states attracting criticism from more than one of the 
surveyed attorneys, only South Carolina (which two attorneys listed as a state to avoid) has 
adopted the Uniform LLC Act, and among the states attracting criticism from a single 
surveyed attorney, only Alabama has adopted the Uniform Act. See supra note 50. 
267 See supra notes 169, 183 and accompanying text. 
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waiver provisions with slightly different language inconsistently with 
the views of attorneys advising clients on where to form LLCs and by 
failing to consider the possible impact of court opinions interpreting 
and applying the waiver provisions. Given these problems and the 
survey results, one should view with skepticism K&R’s conclusion 
that Delaware’s freedom of contract provision does not drive LLC 
formation in Delaware. Instead, the discrepancy between the survey 
results and the K&R study strongly supports the need to study further 
the impact of Section 18-1101 on the choice to form Delaware LLCs 
before drawing any conclusions.268 
The acknowledgement by a substantial fraction of the surveyed 
attorneys that their view of the desirability of Section 18-1101 
depends upon whether they represent prospective managers and 
majority members or represent minority investors might give pause 
before assuming that terms allowed by Section 18-1101 represent the 
optimal balance of competing interests, as opposed to terms favored 
by those choosing the state of formation and drafting the LLC 
agreement. 
Not surprisingly, the highly majority-favoring default rule provided 
by Delaware’s merger provision (which allows the majority to kick 
out the minority or amend the LLC contract) registered as a 
potentially motivating, but only a very minor motivating, factor in the 
reasons given by the surveyed attorneys for forming LLCs in 
Delaware—essentially only showing up in the minority of affirmative 
responses to the specific question about the provision’s impact. More 
interesting were the numerous responses by surveyed attorneys who 
proclaimed complete confidence in their ability to contract around 
either this default rule, or its absence, to obtain the members’ desired 
arrangement. An interesting follow-up study would be to review LLC 
agreements to see the degree to which such agreements actually 
achieve this goal. 
All told, the survey results contradict the notion that there is a 
flight from laxity when it comes to managerial liability or minority 
investor protection. Not only do the surveyed attorneys’ answers 
dealing with freedom of contract and mergers show no flight from 
laxity, the only mention by the surveyed attorneys of the remaining 
variables relied on by D&S as showing a flight from laxity—as, for 
example, dealing with the oppression remedy—contradict the 
 
268 This inquiry is sufficiently narrow to suggest the possibility of a written survey of a 
statistically significant sample of attorneys. 
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conclusion that parties organize LLCs in Delaware for greater 
managerial accountability or minority protections. 
Finally, the mention by a number of the surveyed attorneys of 
provisions which disfavor creditor interests as a reason for forming 
LLCs in Delaware is consistent with the thesis that choice of state of 
formation tends to disfavor the interests of those who do not select in 
which state to form the company. The specific reasons invoked by the 
surveyed attorneys, however, had nothing to do with statutory 
provisions dealing with piercing and failure to follow meeting 
formalities. This suggests that D&S’s 2010 finding of correlation 
between such provisions and state of formation choices is 
coincidental. In any event, the mention—albeit only by a couple of 
the surveyed attorneys—that the attorneys’ clients had formed LLCs 
in Delaware at the insistence of creditors provides some 
countervailing data to the notion that Delaware sacrifices creditor 
interests. It might be more accurate to say that Delaware sacrifices the 
interests of creditors of the members, sometimes to the advantage of 
creditors of the company. 
CONCLUSION 
All told, the insights provided by this survey suggest that, while the 
statistical analysis generated by correlation studies is impressive, it 
never hurts to supplement raw numbers by actually talking to those 
involved with the decisions. This is not to say that survey results 
should be privileged over statistical studies. Rather, these are 
complementary methodologies that should be combined through an 
iterative dialogue. The next stage in this dialogue beckons to those 
interested. 
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APPENDIX 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
I. Introductory Remarks 
I am Franklin A. Gevurtz, Distinguished Professor and Scholar at 
the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
I am conducting a survey to gather information on why Limited 
Liability Companies (LLCs) choose to form in (i.e. organize under the 
laws of) the states that they do. The subjects of this survey are 
business attorneys whose clients organized LLCs and therefore are in 
a position to explain in what state those LLCs were formed and why. 
Your answers will be kept completely confidential and the results 
of this project will be reported in a way to assure anonymity. This 
survey is entirely voluntary and you are free to decline to answer any 
question. It should take around 15 minutes to complete the survey. 
II. Questions Regarding Respondent’s Experience With LLCs 
1. Have you advised clients in forming LLCs? 
2. What were your clients’ expected roles in these LLCs—in 
other words,  did your clients expect to: 
a) be the only members in the LLC 
b) own a majority of membership voting interests in and 
manage the LLC, but not be the only members 
c) be managing members or managers, but not own a 
majority of membership voting interests 
d) be minority members 
e) be the LLC itself 
f) other (explain) 
[Please state all that apply; but also please state which, if any, has 
predominated in your practice.] 
3. Did these LLCs plan to raise money by later selling ownership 
interests to persons not involved in their formation? 
III. Basic Questions Regarding Choice Of State Of Formation 
1. In what state(s) did your clients’ LLCs have their principal 
place(s) of business? 
2. Were these LLCs formed in a state (in other words, established 
as a legal entity under the laws of a state) other than the state 
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of their principal place of business? If so, in what state were 
they formed? 
3. For LLCs formed in a state other than their principal place of 
business, what were the reasons for selecting the particular 
state picked as the state of formation? 
4. To be asked of attorneys who listed more than one state in 
answer to Question III.1: In your experience, were LLCs more 
likely to be formed in a state other than their principal place of 
business if their principal place of business was in certain 
states? If so, for which states was this true and why? Were the 
LLCs less likely to be formed in a state other than their 
principal place of business if their principal place of business 
was in certain states? If so, for which states was this true and 
why? 
5. In your experience, were LLCs of a certain size business more 
likely to be formed in a different state than their principal 
place of business? If so, please explain. 
6. To be asked of attorneys who checked more than one answer 
in response to Question II.2: In your experience, did the 
likelihood of the LLCs being formed in a different state than 
their principal place of business vary depending upon your 
clients’ expected role in the LLC? If so, please explain. 
7. To be asked of attorneys who answered yes to Question II.3: In 
your experience, were LLCs more likely to be formed in a 
different state than their principal place of business if the 
LLCs planned to raise money by later selling ownership 
interests to persons not involved in their formation? 
IV. Questions Regarding Impact Of Statutory Provisions 
1. Were there any particular provisions in a state’s statute 
governing LLCs that made it more likely that your clients’ 
LLC would be formed in this state? 
2. Were there any particular provisions in a state’s statute 
governing LLCs that made it less likely that your clients’ LLC 
would be formed in this state? 
3. Section 18-1101 of Delaware’s Limited Liability Company 
Act provides that the “policy of [the Act is] to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to 
the enforceability of limited liability company agreements” 
and allows elimination of all fiduciary and other duties, except 
for the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
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a) Has this section impacted the likelihood of your clients’ 
LLC being formed in Delaware? If so, how? 
b) Did the answer to the question above depend upon what 
role your client expected to have in the newly formed 
LLC? If so, how? 
c) Do the LLC agreements for any of your clients’ LLCs 
formed in Delaware contain any different provisions or 
language than the agreements would have contained in the 
absence of Section 18-1101? If so, what do these 
provisions or such language say? 
d) Do the LLC agreements for any of your clients’ LLCs 
formed in Delaware contain any provisions eliminating, 
waiving or otherwise limiting fiduciary duties of managers 
or members? If so, what do these provisions say? Are 
identical provisions found in the LLC agreements of your 
clients’ LLCs formed in states other than Delaware? 
4. Section 18-209 of Delaware’s Limited Liability Company Act 
allows, in the absence of explicitly contrary provision in the 
LLC agreement, the majority in ownership to amend the LLC 
agreement, or to remove the minority, through a merger with a 
shell entity. 
a) Has this section impacted the likelihood of your clients’ 
LLC being formed in Delaware? If so, how? 
b) Did the answer to the question above depend upon what 
role your client expected to have in the newly formed 
LLC? If so, how? 
c) Have the LLC agreements for any of your clients’ LLCs 
formed in Delaware contained any different provisions or 
language than the agreements would have contained in the 
absence of Section 18-209? If so, what do these provisions 
or such language say? 
d) Do the LLC agreements for your clients’ LLCs formed in 
Delaware typically contain provisions expressly limiting 
the ability of the majority to amend the LLC agreement or 
remove the minority pursuant to a merger under Section 
18-209? 
e) Do the LLC agreements for your clients’ LLCs formed in 
states other than Delaware typically contain provisions 
allowing the majority to amend the LLC agreement or 
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remove the minority, whether pursuant to a merger or 
otherwise? 
V. Questions Regarding Impact Of Judiciary 
To be asked of attorneys whose answer to Question III.3 involves 
the quality of the Delaware judiciary: 
1. Have you or any attorneys you know represented parties in 
litigation in Delaware courts involving the internal affairs of 
noncorporate entities or non-publicly held corporations? If so, 
what was your impression of the quality of decisions in those 
cases? Can you give examples? 
2. Have you or any attorneys you know represented parties in 
litigation in courts outside Delaware involving the internal 
affairs of noncorporate entities or non-publicly held 
corporations? If so, what was your impression of the quality of 
decisions in those cases? Can you give examples? 
3. Have you read opinions of Delaware courts involving the 
internal affairs of noncorporate entities or non-publicly held 
corporations? If so, what was your impression of the quality of 
those decisions? Can you give examples of opinions that 
established this impression? 
4. Have you read opinions of courts outside of Delaware 
involving the internal affairs of noncorporate entities or non-
publicly held corporations? If so, what was your impression of 
the quality of those decisions? Can you give examples of 
opinions that established this impression? 
5. Is there anything else upon which you have based your 
impression of the quality of the Delaware judiciary when it 
comes to issues involving the internal affairs of LLCs? Please 
explain. 
6. Do the LLC agreements of Delaware LLCs your clients 
formed contain a provision selecting Delaware courts as the 
forum for litigation between members? 
VI. Concluding Questions 
1. Have you discussed the subject of state of formation for LLCs 
with other business attorneys at your firm, or have otherwise 
become aware of what their clients forming LLCs do with 
respect to this issue? If so, would you expect that I would 
receive similar answers to the questions in this survey if I 
interviewed other business attorneys at your firm? Is there 
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anyone at your firm you could refer to me who would provide 
different answers? 
2. Have you discussed the subject of state of formation for LLCs 
with business attorneys at others firms, or have otherwise 
become aware of what their clients forming LLCs do with 
respect to this issue? If so, would you expect that their clients’ 
decisions regarding where to form LLCs and the reasons 
therefore would be similar to the answers you provided to the 
questions in this survey? Do you have any recommendations 
for business attorneys at other firms who I might interview for 
this survey? 
3. Is there anything else that you would like to add that you think 
might be relevant to the issue explored by this survey? 
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